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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BATSON : MIXED MOTIVES
AND DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
RUSSELL D. COVEY*
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on account of protected characteristics such
as race and sex.  Mixed-motive problems arise where the proponent of
a strike confesses to have been motivated by a combination of proper
and improper purposes.  In other contexts, so-called mixed-motive
analysis, which provides the challenged party an opportunity to
prove that the “same decision” would have been made absent the im-
proper motive, has been permitted.  The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, has not yet ruled on whether mixed-motive analysis
is consistent with the governing framework set forth in Batson v.
Kentucky, and those state and federal courts that have addressed
the issue have reached different conclusions.  This Article argues that
the mixed-motive defense should not be permitted under Batson.
That tool was developed in a very different context, serves purposes
not relevant to discrimination in jury selection, and undermines
Batson’s basic goals.  The Article instead proposes the adoption of a
“motivating” or “substantial” factor test, as currently used in Title
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VII mixed-motive cases, to determine when peremptory strikes based
on mixed motives violate the Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The lawfulness of both state and private conduct frequently de-
pends on the purposes that motivated the conduct, and a wide range
of statutory and constitutional law renders otherwise lawful actions un-
lawful if they are motivated by an illicit purpose.  Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 for instance, prohibits employers from making
employment decisions on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national-
ity, and the First Amendment bars the government from firing an em-
ployee because he exercised protected speech rights.2  Whenever such
actions are the subject of legal challenge, courts ultimately must deter-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that a teacher may
not be fired for public criticism of the school board).
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mine what purpose or motive caused the actor to pursue the chal-
lenged course of action.  Motivations, however, are complex; decisions
are often made for multiple purposes.  Sometimes, the purposes moti-
vating those actions reflect a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
objectives, raising the “mixed motive” problem.
Mixed motives raise especially difficult issues in the context of
jury selection.  The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the ex-
clusion of jurors from the venire because of their race violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3  Although
peremptory strikes have traditionally permitted the parties to exclude
any juror for any reason, or for no reason, in Batson v. Kentucky,4 the
Supreme Court held that a peremptory strike is unconstitutional if it
is used to exclude a juror on account of race.  Thus, as with employ-
ment decisions under Title VII, whether a peremptory strike has been
lawfully exercised depends on the proponent’s purpose.  Not surpris-
ingly, courts adjudicating Batson disputes have encountered the same
mixed-motive problem that arises in other kinds of disputes the reso-
lution of which turns on the purposes of the actor.
Elsewhere in the law, the Supreme Court has sanctioned what has
been referred to as “dual motive” or, as here, “mixed motive” analy-
sis.5  Mixed-motive analysis provides a party, shown to have acted from
an unlawful motive, with an opportunity to demonstrate that it would
3. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding that discrimina-
tion against African Americans in jury selection denies African-American defendants equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  At least since 1954, the
Court has acknowledged that the “constitutional command” of the Equal Protection
Clause prevents prosecutors from excluding not only blacks from jury service, but “any
identifiable group in the community which may be the subject of prejudice.”  Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204–05 (1965) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478–79
(1954)) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination on the basis of
ancestry or national origin as well as race and color), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–42 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (setting forth a mixed-motive framework in the Title VII context—when a Title VII
plaintiff proves that gender played a role in an employment decision, the defendant-em-
ployer can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision had it not
taken into account plaintiff’s gender); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (stating that the proper causation inquiry, after the employee
proves that his conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was a “substantial” or
“motivating” factor in the employer’s decision, is whether the employer could prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that “it would have reached the same decision as to [the
employee’s] re-employment even in the absence of the protected conduct”); Vill. of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–71 (1977) (applying a mixed-
motive analysis to determine whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in
the denial of a rezoning application); see also infra Part II.A–B.
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have chosen the same course of action, or made the same decision,
entirely from other lawful motives.6  Depending on the specific area
in which the same-decision defense is asserted, success in showing that
the unlawful motive was not the “but for” cause of the challenged ac-
tion can result in anything from a mere limitation on damages to com-
plete vindication on the merits.  Although the first state courts to
encounter the mixed-motive problem in Batson rejected the use of
mixed-motive analysis and several state courts continue to bar its use,
a small but steadily growing number of courts, including all five fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue, have permit-
ted or affirmatively endorsed it.7  The Supreme Court, however, has
not yet sanctioned the use of mixed-motive analysis in the Batson
context.
In this Article, I argue that the turn to mixed-motive analysis in
jury selection is a serious mistake, one that threatens to undermine
the fragile foundations upon which Batson stands.  Part II sets out the
origins of mixed-motive analysis, showing how the Supreme Court
crafted that analysis from a variety of disparate sources as an analogue
to two doctrines of criminal procedure: the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine and the doctrine of harmless error.  The standard was cho-
sen as an alternative to more traditional tort law causation standards,
notwithstanding the Court’s frequent reliance on basic tort constructs
in its equal protection jurisprudence.  After considering the general
origins and functions of mixed-motive analysis, the Article discusses
three ways state and federal courts have responded to the mixed-
motive problem in the jury-selection context.  First, some courts have
held that a prosecutor’s admission of any improper bias “taints” a
strike and requires invalidation under Batson.8  Second, a growing
number of courts have invoked mixed-motive analysis to assess
whether such mixed explanations are consistent with Batson.9  Third,
other courts have in effect disregarded the improper reason and uti-
lized the regular Batson framework in an attempt to determine
whether the permissible reasons were legitimate or “pretextual.”10
Part III assesses the propriety of these various responses under
the formal Batson framework.  It establishes that, given the governing
equal protection standards, a peremptory strike is facially invalid
where the strike’s proponent attempts to justify it with a mixed-motive
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra notes 122–126. R
8. See infra notes 98–104. R
9. See infra notes 113–126. R
10. See infra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. R
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explanation.  Part III further demonstrates that once a finding of
mixed motives has been made, it is erroneous to proceed any further
under the conventional Batson framework.
Some courts that have relied on mixed-motive analysis, however,
have treated the mixed-motive defense as a supplement to the Batson
framework.  Part IV shows how and why supplementing Batson with
mixed-motive analysis is inappropriate and destructive of Batson’s pur-
poses. Batson serves important symbolic, deterrent, and diversity-en-
hancing functions.  The use of mixed-motive analysis undermines
each of these functions.  Mixed-motive analysis also detracts from Bat-
son’s important evidentiary function of easing the burden of proof of
intentional discrimination that, prior to Batson, had prevented practi-
cal enforcement of equal protection principles in jury selection.
Rather than make it easier to prove discrimination, mixed-motive
analysis encourages obfuscation, fails to recognize subconscious bias,
and substantially complicates an already highly speculative and easily
evaded inquiry.
The better solution, Part V argues, is stringent enforcement of
Batson’s narrow neutrality requirement through application of the
same causation test that Congress has relied upon to resolve the
mixed-motive problem in the Title VII context.  As Congress recog-
nized, the appropriate test for determining whether an equal protec-
tion violation has occurred in a mixed-motive Title VII case is whether
an improper criterion was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for
the challenged strike.  This standard has long been used in tort cases
involving multiple sufficient causes.  As in those cases, the more re-
strictive “same decision” test’s insistence on “but for” causation leads
to unjust results and permits wrongdoers to escape liability for their
concededly wrongful conduct.  Because the primary concerns that
motivated the creation of the mixed-motive defense—windfall protec-
tion and harmless error review—are not relevant in the unique con-
text of peremptory challenge regulation, the use of that defense in
Batson cases is not appropriate, and it should not be permitted.  In-
stead, Batson and its progeny are best read to bar any peremptory
strike in which race, ethnicity, or gender is a “substantial” or “motivat-
ing” factor for its exercise; permitting such race-based strikes under
the guise of “mixed motive” would render Batson’s already meager
protections “unbearably” light.
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II. MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS AND BATSON
Batson v. Kentucky11 represents the Court’s most ambitious at-
tempt to impose meaningful prohibitions on the use of race-based
peremptory challenges.12  Several subsequent cases, decided in quick
succession, broadened and deepened the core principle of Batson:
peremptory strikes may not be used to mask or advance invidious dis-
criminatory purposes.  The Batson principle now applies not only to
the exclusion of jurors on account of race, but also to exclusions on
account of gender and ethnicity;13 it may be invoked by the prosecu-
tor as well as the defendant;14 it applies in civil actions as well as crimi-
nal prosecutions;15 and it can be invoked regardless of whether the
excluded jurors are of the same race as the objecting party.16
Although numerous critics have pointed out that Batson has not
eradicated discrimination in jury selection,17 it is beyond dispute that
it has had a major impact on criminal procedure.  Litigation under
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Batson overruled the portion of Swain v. Alabama that required proof of systematic
racial discrimination to establish an equal protection violation. Id. at 92–93; see also supra
note 3.
13. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion) (ethnicity).  At present, it is unclear whether
Batson also prohibits the use of peremptories to exclude jurors based on their religion. See
generally John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (2004) (arguing that Batson should be extended to bar religion-
based challenges).
14. Cf. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that neither the defendant
nor the prosecutor may exercise racially discriminatory peremptory challenges).
15. E.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending the Bat-
son framework from the criminal context to private litigants in civil cases).
16. E.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that defendants may object to
race-based peremptory challenges of jurors who are not of the same race as the
defendants).
17. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 120 (1999) (arguing that “Batson has by all
accounts done relatively little to eliminate the use of race-based peremptory strikes”); Al-
bert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 209 (1989) (contending that “racial discrimi-
nation is unlikely to yield to the cumbersome, costly, and easily evaded controls created by
the Batson decision”); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional
Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 213 & n.16 (2003) (commenting
that Batson’s framework “has, in practice, been decidedly ineffective in achieving its origi-
nal goals”); Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They
Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 199 (2005) (“[M]ost commentators and practic-
ing lawyers feel that Batson and its progeny have not only stopped short of destroying per-
emptory challenges but have been so ineffective that they have rarely stopped peremptory
challenges based only on unambiguously unconstitutional criteria such as race or
gender.”).
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Batson has proliferated,18 and Batson objections are now an important
weapon in the defense lawyer’s arsenal both at trial and on appeal.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions on the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes have succeeded,
at least at the margins, in eliminating the most overt forms of racial,
gender, and ethnic discrimination from jury selection.19
There is also reason to believe the Court will continue to advance
Batson’s basic goals.  Its decision in the October 2004 Term in Miller-El
v. Dretke,20 for instance, displayed a remarkable impatience with the
Fifth Circuit’s willingness to overlook pronounced discriminatory
practices.21  Capping a protracted struggle with the Fifth Circuit, the
Court invoked Batson to reverse Thomas Miller-El’s almost twenty-year-
old capital murder conviction, overriding state and federal court find-
ings that the conviction was not tainted by racial discrimination.22
The Miller-El decision reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to combat
overt discrimination in jury selection through enforcement of Batson.
But if Miller-El raises hope that the Supreme Court will no longer
abide overt discrimination in jury selection, another development in
the lower federal courts’ Batson jurisprudence—the slow but steady
advance of mixed-motive analysis—threatens to undermine that
promise.
A. Origins of Mixed-Motive Analysis
Mixed-motive analysis originated in Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,23 a case that has been described as a
18. A search of LexisNexis’s “Federal and State Cases, Combined” database on Decem-
ber 28, 2006, using the query “Batson” and “jury” and restricted to the 2005 calendar year
yielded 573 reported cases.
19. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 123 (2001) (describing an
empirical study of jury-selection practices in Philadelphia that found that the Supreme
Court’s “prohibitions against the use of race and gender as the basis for the use of per-
emptories have had, at best, only a marginal impact on the peremptory strike strategies of
each side”).
20. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
21. Id. at 236–37.
22. Id.  The Court found the state court’s conclusion to be an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence, indicating a rare willingness to overturn factual
findings on habeas review, and emphasizing that “[t]he standard is demanding but not
insatiable; as we said the last time this case was here, ‘[d]eference does not by definition
preclude relief.’” Id. at 240 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
23. 429 U.S. 274 (1977); see also Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1263 (1988) (identifying Mt. Healthy as “[t]he doctrinal gene-
sis of the ‘same decision’ test of causation”).
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“mixed-motives constitutional tort case.”24 Mt. Healthy involved a con-
flict between Fred Doyle, an untenured teacher, and the school board
regarding, inter alia, the teacher dress code.25  Doyle communicated
the contents of a school memorandum on the subject to a radio disk
jockey, who in turn reported the adoption of the dress code as news.26
One month later, the school board decided not to renew Doyle’s em-
ployment contract.27  When Doyle requested an explanation, the
school superintendent issued a general statement providing several
reasons for its decision, including Doyle’s call to the radio station.28
Doyle challenged the school board’s decision not to rehire him, argu-
ing that the refusal to renew his contract was in violation of his rights
under the First Amendment.29  The district court concluded that
Doyle was entitled to reinstatement, reasoning that “Doyle’s tele-
phone call to the radio station was ‘clearly protected by the First
Amendment,’ and . . . played a  ‘substantial part’ in the decision of the
Board not to renew Doyle’s employment.”30
In adjudicating Doyle’s claim, the district court had to determine
whether the school board’s retaliatory motive was the “cause” of
Doyle’s injury.31  The causation standard applied by the district court
was drawn from a variety of retaliation cases arising under constitu-
24. Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s Rhetoric
and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 65 (1998)
(quoting Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995)).
25. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 281–82.  The tension arose following the school administra-
tion’s unilateral adoption of a teacher dress code which Doyle, a collective bargaining rep-
resentative for the teachers, had understood to be an issue that would be resolved jointly.
Brief for Respondent at 4–5, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278), 1976 WL 194372.
26. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 282–83 & n.1.
29. Id. at 276.
30. Id. at 283 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, which was attached in the Appendix to the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 12a–13a, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278)).
31. Id. at 284–87 (discussing the test of causation used by the district court and in-
structing the district court on remand to apply the test of causation formulated by the
Court).  Doyle brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
277.  Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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tional law and federal labor law.32  Those cases, in turn, apply causa-
tion analysis borrowed from tort law.
Under well-established tort principles, an act generally is consid-
ered a legal cause of a harm only if it is the “but for” cause, that is, an
act is a legal cause of the “plaintiff’s damage if but for its commission
the damage would not have happened.”33  But tort law recognizes an
exception to the strict requirement of but-for causation in cases of
multiple sufficient causes, where the negligent conduct was sufficient
to bring about the harm but there was another separate and indepen-
dent force that would have brought about the same harm.34  In that
instance, even though the harm would have occurred anyway as a re-
sult of the other cause, as long as the defendant’s wrongful conduct
was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm, the defendant
may be held liable.35  Mixed-motive cases can be analogized to
32. Applying this rule of causation, the district court found a First Amendment viola-
tion because the constitutionally protected conduct, Doyle’s speech, played a “substantial
part” in the school board’s decision not to renew his contract. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
For similar rationales, see, for example, Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District,
520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975) (“A decision to terminate employment of a teacher
which is only partially in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right is unlawful.”);
Simard v. Board of Education, 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[A] discharge motivated
only in part by demonstrable retaliation for exercise of speech and associational rights is
equally offensive to the Constitution.”); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 300 (2d
Cir. 1967) (“[A] discharge motivated only in part by anti-union discrimination is similarly
illegal.”); and NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953) (explaining
that discrimination may be inferred by a “show[ing] that one reason for the discharge is
that the employee was engaging in protected activity.  It need not be the only reason but it
is sufficient if it is a substantial or motivating reason, despite the fact that other reasons
may exist.”). See also Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349–50 (7th Cir. 1970)
(interpreting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), to hold that “race is an
impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision and that it cannot be brushed aside
because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimina-
tion,” and finding “no acceptable place in the law for partial racial discrimination”).
33. Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 946 (1935).  Of
course, normally, but-for causation is not enough; there must also be proximate causation.
Traditional tort law principles further require that in cases of multiple sufficient causes the
wrongful conduct not only was the but-for cause of the harm, but also was a “substantial
factor” in causing the harm to occur. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965)
(outlining what constitutes legal cause).
34. See, e.g., Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902) (explaining that if two or
more wrongdoers contribute to an injury, it “makes no difference that there was no con-
cert between them, or that it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was
caused by each”); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pt. 1), 25 HARV. L. REV.
103, 109 n.20 (1911) (noting an exception to the but-for test of causation “where two or
more tortious causes are simultaneously operating, each being independent of the other,
and each being alone sufficient to produce the damaging result”).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (setting out the substantial factor
test as an exception to the but-for cause requirement).  The “substantial factor” test was
first developed by Judge, and tort scholar, Jeremiah Smith. See Smith, supra note 34, at
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multiple-sufficient-causation cases in that two concurrent “forces”—a
legal motive and an illegal motive—both “cause” an actor to follow a
particular course of action.  The district court apparently applied the
tort law substantial factor causation principle, and upon finding that
the school board’s consideration of protected conduct played a “sub-
stantial part” in its decision not to renew the contract, concluded that
Doyle had carried his burden of proof on the causation issue.36
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously rejected the substan-
tial factor test used by the district court.37  Such a test, the Court indi-
cated, would potentially bestow an undeserved windfall on employees
like Doyle.38  The Court reasoned that “[t]he constitutional principle
at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.”39  Al-
though it recognized that Doyle’s conduct was constitutionally pro-
tected, the Court suggested that Doyle nonetheless was not entitled to
reinstatement as long as the school board would have terminated his
contract regardless of its displeasure with Doyle’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights.40
In reaching this conclusion, the Court, in an opinion authored by
then-Justice Rehnquist, declined to rely on traditional tort causation
standards to determine whether the constitutionally protected con-
duct was a “cause” of the decision to terminate Doyle’s contract.  In-
stead, reviewing a variety of confession and exclusionary rule cases in
which the admissibility of evidence turned on whether the evidence
109–14.  Numerous cases have recognized the substantial factor test. See, e.g., McElwee v.
Wharton, 7 F. App’x 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (asserting that “Michigan law is
clear that when multiple factors contribute to a plaintiff’s injury, liability may be imposed
when a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury”); Sementilli v.
Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (Nelson, J., specially concurring)
(“The substantial factor standard . . . has been embraced as a clearer rule of causation
[than the ‘but for’ test]—one which subsumes the ‘but for’ test while reaching beyond it to
satisfactorily address other situations, such as those involving independent or concurrent
causes in fact.” (quoting Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal.
1997))); see also infra Part V.B (discussing the substantial factor test in tort law).
36. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284–85.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion in relevant part. See Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524
(6th Cir. 1975) (unpublished table decision).
37. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285–86.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 284, 286–87.  The Court reasoned that reinstatement would not be commen-
surate with the harm if the school board were “precluded, because it considered constitu-
tionally protected conduct in deciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a
trier of fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle’s record was such that he would not
have been rehired in any event.” Id. at 286.
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was obtained “because of” unlawful police conduct,41 the Court fash-
ioned a causation standard permitting defendants to establish a func-
tional affirmative defense and avoid liability upon showing that the
causal link between the constitutional violation and the adverse action
was overly attenuated.  Under this same-decision test,42 once the plain-
tiff establishes that his constitutionally protected conduct was a “sub-
stantial” or “motivating” factor in the alleged wrongdoer’s decision
not to rehire him, the defendant can avoid liability if he can establish
“by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.”43  As
in the exclusionary rule context cited by the Court, Mt. Healthy’s cau-
sation defense provides, in effect, that if the permissible motivations
for the government’s action constitute an “independent source” of
the adverse result, then no remedy is warranted.  The test represents a
more stringent causation standard than the tort standard it sup-
planted.  Whereas the traditional tort standard permits imposition of
liability upon a finding that the defendant’s wrongful conduct would
have sufficed to cause the harm, the same-decision test limits liability
to cases in which the wrongful conduct was the but-for cause of the
harm. Mt. Healthy’s mixed-motive test thus substitutes a rule that pre-
sumptively holds wrongdoers liable with a less plaintiff-friendly stan-
dard that appears to have been devised primarily as a remedial
limitation in tort-like actions against the government.44
41. See id. at 286.  The Court noted that “[i]n other areas of constitutional law, this
Court has found it necessary to formulate a test of causation which distinguishes between a
result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so caused,” and that “those are
instructive in formulating the test to be applied here.” Id. at 286–87 (referencing, as exam-
ples, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939)).
42. See Belton, supra note 23, at 1263 (describing Mt. Healthy’s creation of the “same R
decision test of causation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
43. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
44. The mixed-motive test was also invoked in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a case decided the same day as Mt. Healthy.
In Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs sought a zoning variance from the Village to permit con-
struction of a low- and moderate-income housing project that was expected to benefit mi-
norities. Id. at 254.  After the application was denied, the plaintiffs brought an equal
protection challenge against the Village, asserting that the denial was motivated by racially
discriminatory official action.  That proof alone, however, was insufficient to overturn the
zoning board’s decision.  As the Court explained:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the chal-
lenged decision.  Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered.
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B. Mixed Motive and Title VII
Although originally crafted in the constitutional context de-
scribed above, mixed-motive analysis quickly found a home in employ-
ment discrimination law,45 and particularly in the adjudication of
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.46
Mixed-motive analysis received its most extensive treatment in the Ti-
tle VII context in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.47  Prior to Price
Waterhouse, there was widespread disagreement among the circuits re-
garding the proper causation standard in mixed-motive Title VII
cases.48  Although some circuits applied the Mt. Healthy causation rule,
others held that a violation of Title VII was complete for liability pur-
poses upon proof that the employer had been motivated, at least in
part, by a discriminatory purpose.49
The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was Ann Hopkins, the only female
candidate of the eighty-eight persons proposed for partnership that
year at the Price Waterhouse accounting firm.50  Although Hopkins’s
performance at the firm compared favorably with the other partner-
ship candidates, there were some legitimate criticisms of her perform-
ance and ability.51  At the same time, there was substantial evidence
that some Price Waterhouse partners held Hopkins to a higher stan-
Id. at 270–71 n.21.  The framework adopted in Arlington Heights, in which the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant upon a showing that an illicit criterion was a motivating factor
in the decision, was lifted directly from Mt. Healthy.  In the equal protection context, the
Mt. Healthy/Arlington Heights same-decision test has been used primarily as a tool to evalu-
ate legislative motive. Id. at 254.
45. E.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403–05 (1983) (finding that the
NLRB properly relied on Mt. Healthy in applying the same-decision test to an employee’s
claim that he was unlawfully discharged for his union activities); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403–04 n.9 (1977) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that the
company’s failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was
entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not
qualified and would not have been hired in any event.”).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2000); see, e.g., Sheila A. Skojec, Annotation, Effect of
Mixed or Dual Motives in Actions Under Title VII, 83 A.L.R. FED. 268 (1987).
47. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
48. Id. at 238 n.2 (plurality opinion).
49. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City & County of S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1165–67 (9th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing between liability and remedial standards in Title VII cases, and stating as to
the former that “[w]here employment discrimination affects the applicant’s score or the
evaluative process, it suffices to impose initial liability to find that sex was a significant
factor in the decision not to process an application further or in the decision to terminate
an employee,” but as to the latter, “an award of back pay or an order of reinstatement is
appropriate only if the discrimination is a but for cause of the disputed employment ac-
tion, and it follows that a showing of nonqualification would bar such relief”).
50. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 234–35.
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dard because she was a woman.52  In short, the evidentiary record
demonstrated that both legitimate and illegitimate factors motivated
the decision to reject her partnership bid.
The case squarely raised the issue of what standard of causation
should be applied under Title VII to establish a statutory violation in a
mixed-motive case.  Price Waterhouse advocated a standard that
would have required Hopkins, who had shown that her gender played
a part in the employment decision, to prove but-for causation—“the
decision would have been different if the employer had not discrimi-
nated.”53  Hopkins, on the other hand, argued for a per se rule—lia-
bility should be complete upon a showing that an impermissible
criterion played “any part in an employment decision.”54
In a splintered opinion, the Court rejected both positions.  Writ-
ing for a plurality, Justice Brennan crafted an approach using the lan-
guage of tort law.55  Invoking the multiple-sufficient-cause doctrine,
Brennan argued that it makes no sense to say that a “causally overde-
termined” outcome—for instance, one in which two forces operate on
an object and both forces are sufficient to disturb the object—has no
cause.56  Instead, Brennan reasoned, it makes sense to say that both
forces were “causes” of the outcome.57  As noted above, in the case of
multiple sufficient causation, tort law has long held that proof that the
defendant’s wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in the outcome
is sufficient to warrant holding the defendant liable for the harm,
even if his wrongful conduct was not “strictly speaking” the but-for
cause of the harm.58  Like the district court in Mt. Healthy, the plural-
ity indicated that the substantial factor test was the proper standard.59
So “[t]he question [was] not whether the other causes would have
been sufficient without the defendant’s wrong, but whether the defen-
dant’s wrong was actually a material factor in producing the injury.”60
Applying that logic, Brennan asserted that a Title VII plaintiff satisfies
her burden on the issue of causation if she establishes that a discrimi-
52. Id. at 235–36.
53. Id. at 237–38.
54. Id. at 238.  Hopkins further argued that an employer’s proof that “it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination” would merely limit equitable
relief. Id.
55. See id. at 242; Maatman, supra note 24, at 18 (noting that the plurality in Price R
Waterhouse employed legal language borrowed from tort law “to justify its causation
standard”).
56. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion).
57. See id. (refusing to accept that causally overdetermined events have no cause at all).
58. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
59. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247–50 (plurality opinion).
60. Carpenter, supra note 33, at 952. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 14 12-FEB-07 15:23
292 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:279
natory criterion was a substantial factor relied upon by the employer
in reaching its decision.61  That other motives also influenced the em-
ployer’s decision does not negate the causal significance of the illicit
motive, since “Title VII [was] meant to condemn even those decisions
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”62
The plurality reasoned that the plaintiff is not required to prove but-
for causation because the statute focuses on the actual conduct of em-
ployers at the moment the employment decision was made.63  In a
case where an adverse employment decision was motivated in fact by
an illicit criterion—in other words, where the improper criterion was
actually in the head of the decisionmaker—the purposes of the statute
have been contravened.
The plurality’s adherence to the tort multiple-sufficient-causation
model, however, ended there.  In an analytical move rightly criticized
by the dissent as internally inconsistent, the plurality, joined by Jus-
tices White and O’Connor, went on to state that although the plaintiff
carries her burden on the causation issue by proving that an illicit
criterion was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision, the
defendant could nonetheless avert liability if it could establish, under
the mixed-motive standard set forth in Mt. Healthy, that the illicit crite-
rion was not the but-for cause of the decision.64  But-for causation, the
Price Waterhouse Court indicated, was a necessary ingredient in a Title
VII liability determination; however, the Court agreed that the burden
to prove the lack of but-for causation should shift to the defendant—
the defendant “knowingly created the risk” that but-for causation can-
not be proven one way or the other, and this risk was created “not by
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241–42 (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id. at 240–41.
64. See id. at 247 n.12 (noting the dissent’s failure to explain why the evidentiary
scheme endorsed in Mt. Healthy was not workable in Title VII cases); id. at 258 (White, J.,
concurring) (“[T]o determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look
only to the Court’s opinion in Mt. Healthy.” (citation omitted)); id. at 268–69 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (relying on the same-decision theory of causation).  The Price Waterhouse
Court also relied heavily on a case arising under federal labor law, NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., which utilized the same mixed-motive framework set forth in Mt.
Healthy. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249–50 (plurality opinion) (citing NLRB v. Transp.
Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)).  According to the Price Waterhouse Court, once the
factfinder establishes that the challenged action was motivated in part by discriminatory
animus, the challenged party “must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision.” Id.
at 248.  Specifically, if the challenged party wishes to prevail, it must persuade the
factfinder “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same deci-
sion” even absent the impermissible motive. Id. at 249 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
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innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.”65  A majority of Justices
agreed that “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid . . . liability only by proving that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.”66
As the dissent noted, the plurality’s simultaneous assertions—(1)
an adverse employment decision is “because of” sex as long as sex was
considered by the employer in making the decision, and (2) an em-
ployer is not liable if it can prove that sex was not a but-for cause of
the decision—cannot both be true.67
Although the Court faltered in carrying through with the logical
parallel from the multiple-sufficient-causation doctrine in Title VII
mixed-motive cases, Congress moved swiftly to correct it.  In response
to Price Waterhouse, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,68
which, inter alia, amended Title VII to clarify that a plaintiff who es-
tablishes that an adverse employment decision was made because of
mixed motives has proven discrimination.69  Underlying the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 was a recognition that whenever an improper crite-
rion is a motivating factor in an employment decision, Title VII’s stat-
65. Id. at 250 (quoting Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 403); see also id. at 261–62
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that it is appropriate to shift the burden with respect
to causation “where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly
giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion”).
66. Id. at 244–45 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); id. at 261 n.* (White, J., con-
curring); id. at 269 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Of some significance to the argument
pursued here, in affirming the propriety of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defen-
dant, Justice O’Connor invoked earlier jury-selection cases as precedent. See id. at 267–68
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Once the consideration of race in the decisional process had
been established, we held that ‘the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the pre-
sumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.’” (quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))).
67. Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Believing that but-for causation was an essen-
tial element of proof of a violation, Justice Kennedy further argued that the plaintiff,
rather than the defendant, should at all times maintain “‘the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’” in
a mixed-motive case. Id. at 286–87 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
68. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
69. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by,
inter alia, adding subsection (m): “Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”  § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)).  For a discussion of the 1991 Amendments, see
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litiga-
tion, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 584–88 (1996).
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utory prohibition is contravened.70  As amended, Title VII now
permits the employer, under the mixed-motive test, to introduce
proof that it would have made the same decision notwithstanding the
improper motive; the effect of prevailing is merely to limit the obliga-
tion to pay compensatory damages and backpay.71  A plaintiff who es-
tablishes that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other fac-
tors also motivated the practice,”72 may be awarded declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.73  With respect to the
liability determination, Title VII now operates under a per se rule, and
the statutory scheme expressly acknowledges that a plaintiff’s proof
that an employer’s improper purpose was a “motivating factor” in an
adverse employment action against her is sufficient to establish a
violation.
C. Mixed Motive in Batson Cases
Batson was decided in 1986, nine years after Mt. Healthy.  It was
only a matter of time, and a short time at that, before the mixed-mo-
tive problem emerged in the Batson context. Batson employed a three-
step framework to resolve allegations regarding the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in jury selection.  At step one of the frame-
work, a party challenging a strike has the burden to make out a prima
facie case that the strike was exercised for a discriminatory purpose.74
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the inquiry pro-
ceeds to step two, where the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a
70. See Zimmer, supra note 69, at 584–85 (noting that the amendments rejected the R
substantial factor test and adopted the motivating factor standard).
71. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 & n.2 (2003).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
73. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
74. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94, 96–97 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (stating that the first step under the Batson framework requires a
defendant to “make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised
on the basis of race”).  At this stage, the defendant need not prove discriminatory intent;
rather, he need only point to facts consistent with such illicit intent as to fairly put the issue
into play. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–95 (explaining that a defendant can make out a prima
facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose” (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976))).  The
“relevant facts” or “circumstances” supporting an inference of discrimination may include
the use of the strike against a member of a protected class, the “pattern” of strikes exer-
cised by the challenged party, or any other evidence that might support an inference of
discrimination. Id. at 96–97 (noting that “all relevant circumstances” should be considered
by the trial court in determining whether a defendant has made the necessary showing).
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neutral explanation for striking the juror.75  If the prosecutor meets
that minimal burden, the analysis then proceeds to a third step, in
which the court must decide, in light of the totality of the facts and
evidence, whether the neutral reason proffered by the challenged
party was pretextual and the challenged strike was, in fact, a product
of discrimination.76
Although Batson’s three-step framework was borrowed expressly
from the Supreme Court’s Title VII jurisprudence,77 it shares many
features with several earlier jury-selection cases that also utilized a bur-
den-shifting framework.78  For example, in Neal v. Delaware,79 the
Court found that the fact that no black citizen had ever been sum-
moned to serve as a juror in Delaware “presented a prima facie case of
denial” of equal protection rights, and that the State’s response—
there was not a single black juror in the state who possessed the quali-
fications to serve as a juror—was a “violent presumption” unworthy of
credence.80  Once a prima facie case is established, it has been recog-
nized, “[t]he burden of proof is then upon the State to refute it.”81
The Court’s jury-selection cases have adhered to this basic analytical
structure, holding that statistical or circumstantial evidence of the sys-
tematic exclusion of members of a particular race from jury service
constitutes “prima facie proof” of a constitutional violation, and that
the government must adduce sufficient evidence of a nondiscrimina-
tory purpose to rebut the prima facie case.82 Batson’s three-step
75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 97.  Once the defendant establishes a prima facie showing
that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race, “the burden shifts to
the [prosecution] to come forward with a [race-]neutral explanation” for striking the juror
in question. Id. at 97.
76. See id. at 97–98; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (explaining that, after
the prosecution provides “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of [its] legitimate
reasons for exercising the challeng[e],” the trial court has “the duty to determine if the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination” (citing and quoting Batson, 476 U.S.
at 98 & n.20) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168
(2005) (same).
77. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18.
78. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494–95 (1977) (employing a burden-
shifting framework to determine purposeful discrimination in the grand jury selection con-
text); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631–32 (1972) (same).
79. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
80. Id. at 397.
81. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 233 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Harper v. State, 171 So. 2d 129, 133 (Miss. 1965)).
82. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481–82 (1954) (reversing the defen-
dant’s conviction after the State was unable to rebut prima facie proof of the systematic
exclusion of Mexican Americans from jury service); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
598–99 (1935) (concluding that the government failed to rebut the defendant’s prima
facie case of recurrent exclusion of blacks from jury service).
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framework extends and elaborates upon this procedural structure and
thus marks a continuity rather than a break in its approach to discrim-
ination claims in jury selection.
The mixed-motive problem, of course, arises in Batson when the
proponent of a challenged strike, at step two, proffers an explanation
that includes both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  Courts facing a
mixed-motive explanation have responded in three ways.  Some courts
have held that when the prosecutor includes a discriminatory reason
among the reasons proffered to justify a strike, the prosecutor has
failed to satisfy his step-two burden.83  These courts have reasoned
that Batson’s framework commands that the proponent of a strike
come forward with a neutral explanation, but that any explanation
that, in whole or in part, includes race or gender vitiates neutrality.84
As such, the proper response to a mixed-motive explanation is to ter-
minate the inquiry and sustain the objection.85  Other courts, ac-
knowledging the mixed nature of an explanation where not all of the
articulated reasons were improper, have nonetheless proceeded to
step three to conduct a conventional Batson pretext analysis.86  Finally,
83. See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing the defen-
dant’s convictions because the State’s non-neutral reason for striking the juror—“he was a
southern male”—impermissibly tainted the entire jury-selection process); McCormick v.
State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ind. 2004) (finding that the non-race neutral reason prof-
fered by the State, despite the State’s offering of other race-neutral reasons, impermissibly
tainted the jury selection under Batson); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998)
(expressly rejecting the dual-motivation doctrine on the grounds that “any consideration
of discriminatory factors . . . is in direct contravention of the purpose of Batson which is to
ensure peremptory strikes are executed in a nondiscriminatory manner”); State v. King,
572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]here the challenged party admits reliance
on a prohibited discriminatory characteristic, we do not see how a response that other
factors were also used is sufficient rebuttal under the second [Batson prong].” (quoting
State v. Jagodinsky, 563 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997))); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d
862, 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (same); cf. Robinson v. United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1284 &
n.21 (D.C. 2005) (explaining that “[a] peremptory challenge may not be based even par-
tially on an unlawful discriminatory reason,” but choosing not to decide whether the same-
decision defense is available to the prosecutor).
84. See, e.g., Robinson, 878 A.2d at 1284 (“[E]ven if the prosecutor acted from mixed
motives, some of which were non-discriminatory, his actions deny equal protection and
violate Batson if race or gender influenced his decision.”).
85. See, e.g., Payton, 495 S.E.2d at 210 (holding that, regardless of how many other non-
discriminatory factors are considered, any consideration of a discriminatory factor taints
the entire jury-selection process under Batson; thus, “[t]he challenged party should not
have an opportunity to convince the judge that he would have struck the juror regardless
of the discriminatory reason”).
86. See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that
the state court’s decision “that the second step of the Batson analysis can be met by articu-
lating both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a strike is not contrary to or an unrea-
sonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent”), rev’d en banc, Kesser v.
Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006).
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a third group of courts have refused to find that an admission of dis-
criminatory animus constitutes a per se Batson violation.  Instead, they
have invoked “mixed motive” or “dual motivation” analysis, at the sec-
ond or third step, to determine whether the strike violates the Equal
Protection Clause.87
The early court decisions that grappled with the problem of
mixed motives generally concluded that a mixed-motive explanation
did not satisfy Batson’s step-two requirement to proffer a “neutral ex-
planation” for a strike.  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was
one of the first courts to expressly confront the problem, in Owens v.
State.88  The prosecutor in Owens, after having used fifteen of his
twenty-four strikes against blacks, initially explained that the primary
reason for striking one black juror was “age and single status.”89
When pressed for additional reasons by the trial judge, however, the
prosecutor admitted that “the fact that [the juror] was the same race
as the defendant was a factor.”90  Based on this admission, the court
concluded that the prosecutor had not come forward with the neutral
explanation required by step two of the Batson framework, and it thus
held that the trial court’s finding to the contrary was clearly errone-
ous.91  In reaching this conclusion, the court described the problem
as one of “mixed motive,” but did not directly address the Supreme
Court’s mixed-motive cases or the framework suggested in those cases
to resolve the Batson problem.
Shortly after the Alabama Criminal Court decided Owens, two Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States, writing in dissent
from the denial of certiorari, also rejected the use of mixed-motive
analysis in the Batson context.  In Wilkerson, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals refused to find a Batson violation, despite the prosecutor’s
admission that “race was a factor” in his peremptory strike of an Afri-
can-American juror, because race was merely “[o]ne of the many con-
siderations” and “nothing major.”92  Justice Marshall, joined in dissent
87. See cases cited infra notes 122–126. R
88. 531 So. 2d 22, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that it failed to “see how any
explanation can meet the four articulated  [neutral-explanation] requirements [in Batson]
if [the challenge] is based, in part, on race”).  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also
invoked mixed-motive analysis to uphold a conviction in the face of a Batson challenge
around the same time; however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case. See
Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
924, 925–26 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing the trial
court’s mixed-motive approach).
89. Owens, 531 So. 2d at 23–24.
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id. at 24–26.
92. Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 924–25 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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by Justice Brennan, argued that a mixed-motive explanation “cannot
be squared with Batson’s unqualified requirement that the state offer
‘a neutral explanation’ for its peremptory challenge[s].”93  In Justice
Marshall’s view, a neutral explanation could only be understood as
one based “wholly on nonracial criteria.”94  Adaptation of the mixed-
motive defense in the Batson context, in Justice Marshall’s view, was
also inappropriate “because of the special difficulties of proof” that
would arise.95
At the same time, other Texas courts interpreted Batson to re-
quire strict neutrality.96  As early as 1987, an intermediate appellate
court in Texas concluded that although a prosecutor might articulate
one or more race-neutral reasons along with a non-neutral reason for
striking a minority juror, “a prosecutor’s admission that race was an
influencing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of the
entire procedure.”97  In 1991, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed
that approach, holding that any consideration of race in jury selection
violates equal protection.98  Several state courts, including Indiana,99
Arizona,100 Georgia,101 South Carolina,102 and Wisconsin,103 have en-
dorsed this “taint approach,” reasoning that the inclusion of a discrim-
inatory factor in an explanation, “[r]egardless of how many other
nondiscriminatory factors” are also proffered, “taints the entire jury
selection process.”104
93. Id. at 926 (emphasis added) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not followed the Supreme Court of
Texas’ lead in finding a Batson violation if race was used as any factor in a peremptory
strike. E.g., Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 246–48 & n.18, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(en banc) (rejecting the “taint approach” in favor of mixed-motive analysis).  For a discus-
sion of the battle among Texas courts over the mixed-motive issue, see Ross P. Brooks,
Comment, Mixed Messages: Texas’ Two Highest Courts Deliver Conflicting Opinions Regarding the
Fourteenth Amendment Mixed Motive Doctrine as Applied in the Context of Batson/Edmonson
Juror Exclusion Hearings, 6 SCHOLAR 311 (2004); and Geoffrey A. Gannaway, Comment,
Texas Independence: The Lone Star State Serves as an Example to Other Jurisdictions as it Rejects
Mixed-Motive Defenses to Batson Challenges, 21 REV. LITIG. 375 (2002).
97. Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App. 1987); see also McKinney v. State,
761 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App. 1988) (citing Speaker, 740 S.W.2d at 489).
98. Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
99. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112–13 (Ind. 2004).
100. State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
101. Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
102. State v. Shuler, 545 S.E.2d 805, 811 (S.C. 2001).
103. State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535–36 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
104. Lucas, 18 P.3d at 163.  The taint theory was developed in several Texas intermedi-
ate appellate court opinions. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 811 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.
1991) (“Even though the prosecutor may have given one racially neutral explanation, the
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This early momentum came to an abrupt halt, however, with the
Second Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Senkowski.105  For better or
worse, Howard has proved tremendously influential in shaping the de-
bate over mixed motives.  The facts in Howard are similar to those in
Owens and Wilkerson.  In 1984, prior to Batson, Clifford Howard was
tried in a New York state court for various charges, including rob-
bery.106  During jury selection, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
after the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the only two
black jurors from the venire.107  The motion was denied, and Howard
was convicted by an all-white jury.108  While Howard’s appeal was
pending, Batson was decided.109  Finding that Howard had established
a prima facie case of discrimination, the state appellate court re-
manded Howard’s case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
prosecutor’s reasons for the strikes.110
At the hearing, the prosecutor candidly admitted that race was a
factor in his decision to strike the black jurors.  He contended, how-
ever, that “race had not been an ‘overriding’ or a ‘major’ factor,”111
and stated that he also took into account several neutral factors, in-
cluding that one of the black jurors seemed to lack a sufficient educa-
tion and that the other black juror had limited work experience,
expressed no views on an important issue in the case, had no connec-
tion to law enforcement, and might be sympathetic to the defendant
given that she was a mother of five children.112  Applying the three-
step pretext analysis from the Title VII case Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine,113 the state court found “that race had been
‘part of a totality of factors’ for the prosecutor’s challenges, that the
prosecutor had articulated neutral explanations, and that the explana-
tions were not pretextual.”114  The state court then concluded that
Howard failed to establish purposeful discrimination.115
racially motivated explanation ‘vitiates the legitimacy of the entire [jury selection] proce-
dure.’” (quoting Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App. 1987))).
105. 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).







113. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
114. Howard, 986 F.2d at 26 (citing People v. Howard, No. 56387, slip op. at 5 (Nassau
County Ct. Nov. 6, 1987)).
115. Id.
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Although the Second Circuit found the state court’s pretext anal-
ysis too demanding of criminal defendants, it declined to endorse the
taint approach to mixed-motive cases.116  On the one hand, the Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that the state court applied the wrong legal stan-
dard—Burdine’s pretext approach—because the question was not
about pretext; once the challenger satisfied his burden to prove im-
proper motivation, it was no longer necessary to inquire as to whether
the challenger sustained his burden of showing “purposeful discrimi-
nation.”117  On the other hand, the Second Circuit declined to en-
dorse a per se rule, such as the taint approach.118  Instead, the court,
invoking Mt. Healthy, endorsed the use of dual-motivation analysis:
“[o]nce the claimant has proven improper motivation, dual motiva-
tion analysis is available to the person accused of discrimination to
avoid liability by showing that the same action would have been taken
in the absence of the improper motivation that the claimant has
proven.”119  Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that “Howard was
entitled to prevail unless, under dual motivation analysis, the prosecu-
tor could sustain his burden of showing that he would have exercised
his challenges solely for race-neutral reasons.”120  Because neither the
state court nor the federal district court “imposed that burden upon
the prosecutor,” the Second Circuit remanded the case so that the
dual-motivation analysis could be applied.121
The approach endorsed by the Second Circuit in Howard122 has
subsequently been adopted by several other federal circuit courts of
appeals, including the Third,123 Fourth,124 Eighth,125 and Eleventh.126
Although the current trend unmistakably favors an embrace of dual-
116. See id. at 30–31.
117. See id. at 27, 30.
118. Id. at 28–29.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id. at 30.
121. Id. at 30–31.
122. The Second Circuit cited Howard with approval in two subsequent cases: United
States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 662 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003), and United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d
1313, 1328 (2d Cir. 1996).
123. Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2002).
124. Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995).
125. United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Weaver v. Bow-
ersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001) (relying on Darden for its dual-motivation analy-
sis and upholding the Missouri Supreme Court’s determination that the prosecutor would
have exercised the strike even absent his discriminatory motive).
126. Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also
King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting adherence to Wallace’s dual-
motivation approach); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996) (apply-
ing the dual-motivation approach used in Howard and Wallace).  Although the Seventh Cir-
cuit has not yet adopted mixed-motive analysis, Judge Cudahy opined, in a partial dissent,
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or mixed-motive analysis, several federal circuit courts, numerous state
courts,127 and the Supreme Court have yet to address its permissibil-
ity.128  This turn to dual- or mixed-motive analysis in the Batson con-
text, however, is a mistake that threatens to undermine whatever
safeguards Batson provides against discriminatory jury selection.  As I
argue below, a different approach is necessary to safeguard the mini-
mal gains achieved in Batson’s two-decade reign.
III. BATSON, NEUTRALITY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
More than 100 years before Batson was decided, the Supreme
Court declared that the equal protection guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion prohibits the exclusion of jurors on account of race,129 and in
case after case, the Court has reaffirmed that principle.130  Thus, ju-
rors may not be excluded from jury service because of an illicit crite-
rion.  But what does the slippery term “because of” mean in the
peremptory strike context, in which jurors traditionally can be ex-
cluded “for any reason or no reason”?131  What if a juror was struck
because of both neutral and non-neutral criteria?132  Can such an ex-
that it should. See Holder v. Welborn, 60 F.3d 383, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See, e.g., People v. Schmeck, 118 P.3d 451, 475 (Cal. 2005) (finding no need to
resolve “whether a mixed-motive peremptory challenge could constitute a violation of the
defendant’s constitutional rights”).
128. In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed a panel decision affirming the
use of mixed-motive analysis.  Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 371 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).  One judge argued, in a concurring opinion, that mixed-motive analysis was not
appropriate in Batson cases. Id. at 376–77 (Berzon, J., concurring).  In addition, some
courts that have affirmed a state’s use of mixed motive under the highly deferential habeas
review standards mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000), have either implicitly or
expressly reserved any judgment regarding whether Batson is best read to permit mixed
motive should the issue arise on direct review. See, e.g., Gattis, 278 F.3d at 225 (holding that
“the state courts’ application of dual motivation analysis to [the defendant’s] Batson chal-
lenge did not result in a decision that ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of, Federal law’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1))).
129. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
130. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
386 (1881); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 580–81 (1896); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442, 447–48 (1900); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303
U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357 (1939); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–05 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
131. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956) (noting that peremp-
tory challenges give each party “discretion to exclude jurors deemed objectionable for any
reason or no reason”).  For a historical overview of the evolution of jury-selection chal-
lenges, see William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1406–16 (2001) (tracing history beginning with English law from 1100s
and early 1200s through contemporary American practice).
132. As a review of the mixed-motive cases indicates, the mixed-motive problem has
arisen where prosecutors have admitted that race or sex was a “factor,” or where they
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planation be considered “neutral”?  Does the fact that at least one of
the reasons proffered by the proponent of the strike is neutral suffice
to satisfy the step-two burden?  As will be discussed below, fundamen-
tal equal protection principles preclude that conclusion.
struck a juror because they “preferred” a jury with a different racial or sex composition, or
where they feared that a common racial or sex characteristic between the juror and the
defendant might create bias.  In Howard v. Senkowski, for instance, the prosecutor admitted
that race was “a factor” in the decision to strike, because he believed it “made them sympa-
thetic to the defendant,” but alleged that other factors, including the prospective jurors’
education, intelligence, and limited work experience, were more important considera-
tions.  986 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1993).  In Gattis v. Snyder, “the prosecutor exercised a per-
emptory challenge against an elderly African-American male.”  278 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d
Cir. 2002).  There, the prosecutor gave two reasons for the strike: (1) the prospective ju-
ror’s “very conservative” views regarding the “application of the death penalty” and (2) his
gender. Id. at 232.  As to the gender-based motive, the prosecutor characterized the juror
as “an older gentleman,” and explained that “we would prefer to have some more women
on the jury” because of the presence of several other older gentlemen on the jury panel.
Id.  In United States v. Darden, the prosecutor gave two reasons for striking a female African-
American juror.  70 F.3d 1507, 1530–31 (8th Cir. 1995).  First, he stated his belief that
“young black females . . . tend to . . . be more sympathetic toward individuals who are
involved in narcotics.” Id. at 1530.  Second, he stated that he struck the juror because she
“said virtually nothing” during the voir dire and thus he believed her to be “either naı¨ve or
withholding information,” or to have “virtually no experience with the criminal justice sys-
tem.” Id.  In Weaver v. Bowersox, the prosecutor stated that he struck an African-American
female juror “for a number of reasons,” including her hesitation in answering questions
about the death penalty and lack of eye contact.  241 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2001).  He
also added that, “[i]n any event, [he] was not persuaded that she could give the death
penalty, particularly to a fellow black person,” and observed that she was “cutting up and
talking to the black gentleman next to her.” Id.  In King v. Moore, the prosecutor proffered
the following explanation for striking an African-American female: “She is a young black
female[;] the Defendant is a young black male.  Her response to the Court’s inquiry with
regard to her feelings about the death penalty we felt were sufficient for us to have concern
about how she would apply the law.”  196 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (alteration in
original).  In Wallace v. Morrison, the prosecutor was asked by the trial judge if he “con-
sider[ed] race in striking these ones that you struck, the black ones you struck?”  87 F.3d
1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The prose-
cutor responded by explaining that he used a rating system to assign numbers to prospec-
tive jurors, adding that “[r]ace was a factor that I considered just as I considered age, just as
I considered their place of employment and so on.” Id. (emphasis omitted). In Kesser v.
Cambra, the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes against all three Native Americans on
the venire.  392 F.3d 327, 330–32 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir.
2006).  When called to explain his strike of the first juror, he stated that “[m]y experience
is that Native Americans who are employed by the tribe are a little more prone to associate
themselves with the culture and beliefs of the tribe than they are with the mainstream
system, and . . . they are sometimes resistive . . . and . . . suspicious of the [criminal justice]
system.” Id. at 331–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). He also gave several additional,
neutral reasons for striking the juror, including that she seemed to him to be pretentious,
emotional, from a dysfunctional family, and fairly weak. Id. at 332.
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A. The Meaning of “Neutrality” at Batson’s Step Two
Analysis of the mixed-motive problem begins with consideration
of what constitutes a “neutral explanation” at step two of the Batson
inquiry.  In Hernandez v. New York,133 the Supreme Court considered a
Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s strikes against bilingual Hispanic
jurors, which the prosecutor justified by expressing concern that such
jurors would not defer to the translator’s official translation of witness
testimony.134  In rejecting the Batson challenge, the Court made clear
that the question at step two is narrow, holding that an explanation is
“neutral” as long as there is no literal admission of purposeful discrim-
ination.135  An explanation at step two is legally neutral, according to
Hernandez, “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prose-
cutor’s explanation.”136  Because the explanation offered by the pros-
ecutor did not literally turn on the race or ethnicity of the bilingual
jurors, the proffered explanation satisfied the neutrality requirement.
The Court revisited the step-two inquiry four years later in Purkett
v. Elem,137 where two black men were struck purportedly because of
the way their hair looked, particularly their facial hair.138  In reversing
the Eighth Circuit’s finding that the prosecutor had failed to adduce a
reason that satisfied Batson’s second step, the Court underscored that
the burden at step two was purely one of production, not persua-
sion.139  The Elem Court interpreted the step-two burden as setting
forth what is in effect a pleading standard rather than an evidentiary
standard.  To satisfy its burden of production, the proponent of a
strike need not proffer an explanation that is credible to survive scru-
tiny, and at step two, the trial court should not be concerned with
whether the tendered explanation is “persuasive, or even plausi-
ble.”140  That evaluation takes place at step three.141  In construing
step two in this manner, the Court did no more than follow its Title
VII jurisprudence, where it already had declared that, at step two of
the comparable McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a Title VII “de-
133. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
134. Id. at 360 (plurality opinion).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
138. Id. at 766 (per curiam).
139. Id. at 767–68.
140. Id. at 768.
141. Id. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that proposition in Johnson v. California,
545 U.S. 162, 171 (2005) (noting that “even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly
nonsensical justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely proceeds to step
three”).
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fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons.”142  After Elem, courts are not authorized to ter-
minate a Batson inquiry at step two as long as the prosecutor provides
a facially neutral explanation.  But Hernandez and Elem did not elimi-
nate step two altogether.143
The Elem Court was quick to point out that although facially neu-
tral explanations satisfy the step two burden, “implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for pur-
poseful discrimination” at step three.144 Elem, in other words, defers
scrutiny rather than prohibits it.  Such a reading is consistent with Bat-
son’s obvious intent to create enforceable evidentiary rules. Batson was
handed down largely in recognition that the Swain v. Alabama re-
gime145 had failed to stop the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, and its authors undoubtedly intended courts to apply its
requirements to provide effective enforcement of the nondiscrimina-
tion principle.146  Although Elem bars any searching credibility deter-
142. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).  In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court set forth a three-step burden-shifting framework to help
lower courts resolve the evidentiary inquiry mandated by Title VII, which prohibits racial
discrimination in any employment decision.  411 U.S. 792, 793–94, 796 (1973).  Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff “must carry the initial burden under the statute of establish-
ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Id. at 802.  If the complainant succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case, the “burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id.  Finally, if the
employer comes forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts
back to the complainant to show that the employer’s stated reason “was in fact pretext.” Id.
at 804.  This framework was affirmed again in Burdine.  450 U.S. at 252–53.  As a matter of
logic, a finding that the proffered explanation was pretextual does not necessitate a con-
clusion that the challenged action was the product of purposeful discrimination.  It is en-
tirely possible that the defendant will articulate a false explanation for a challenged action
to hide a permissible (although embarrassing or irrational) purpose rather than an imper-
missible one.  Acknowledging this possibility, the Supreme Court explained in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks that, to show pretext, the plaintiff in a Title VII case must prove not
only that the pretextual explanation is false but also that discrimination is the true pur-
pose.  509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).  Remarking that its “decisions concerning ‘disparate treat-
ment’ under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the operation of prima
facie burden of proof rules”—“[t]he party alleging that he has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination carries the ultimate burden of persuasion”—the Batson Court
adapted the formal structure of Title VII to the jury-selection context.  Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18, 96–98 (1986).
143. See, e.g., Jose´ Felipe´ Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in
the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 373 (1998) (asserting that
“[t]he Elem opinion in many ways renders useless the ten years of Batson jury selection
jurisprudence”).
144. 514 U.S. at 768.
145. See cases cited supra note 130. R
146. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93 (noting that its decision to overturn Swain was necessary
because Swain’s requirement that challengers adduce proof of repeated striking of blacks
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minations at step two, Elem does not disturb the conditional nature of
the Batson framework, which requires the state to carry its burden of
production before the inquiry may properly proceed to step three.147
A neutral explanation may remain legally sufficient even if it is “silly or
superstitious,”148 but it must nonetheless be free of any inherent dis-
criminatory intent.149  That is, the proponent of a challenged strike
still must come forward with an explanation for the strike that does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.150 Elem’s
creation of a strict pleading standard heightens the importance of the
criteria used to assess the legal neutrality of a proffered explanation.
Ultimately, whether or not an explanation proffered at step two is suf-
ficient depends on the governing equal protection standards.  It is to
those standards we now turn.
B. Neutrality and Equal Protection
Modern equal protection law is grounded in the requirement,
recognized in Washington v. Davis,151 that an equal protection claim
cannot prevail absent proof of purposeful discrimination.152  Arguably
the most important equal protection decision of its time,153 Davis de-
finitively established that disparate impact evidence alone is insuffi-
over many cases had erected a “crippling burden of proof” that rendered “prosecutors’
peremptory challenges . . . largely immune from constitutional scrutiny”).
147. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767 (“If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
racial discrimination.” (emphasis added)).
148. See id. at 768.
149. Id. (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
The Hernandez Court explained that “[a] neutral explanation . . . means an explanation
based on something other than the race of the juror.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. See also
id. at 374 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Batson’s requirement of a race-neutral explanation
means an explanation other than race.”).
150. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (plurality opinion) (“At this [second] step of the in-
quiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”); cf. Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981) (explaining that in a Title VII case, the
defendant only carries his burden of production at step two if “[t]he explanation pro-
vided . . . [is] legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant”).
151. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
152. Id. at 239–40; cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965) (explaining the
fact that minorities were underrepresented on juries does not alone establish evidence of
purposeful discrimination).
153. Davis has been described by commentators “as the most important equal protec-
tion case of the last quarter-century.” E.g., Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1832 (2000); K.G. Jan
Pillai, Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 525, 538 (2001).
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cient to establish an equal protection violation.154  But government
decisions, whether made by a group or an individual, are often made
for multiple reasons.  If a government action does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause unless it can be tied to a discriminatory pur-
pose, how subjectively important must that purpose be?  Must it be the
sole, or dominant, aim or purpose?155
Relying largely on tort standards156 and decided the same day as
Mt. Healthy, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp. supplied an answer, clarifying that Davis’s requirement that
disparate impact be linked to a discriminatory purpose does not mean
that the discriminatory purpose must be the “sole” motivation for the
challenged action.157  Although some precedent suggested that un-
constitutional discrimination only occurs where the sole purpose of
the actor was invidious,158 Arlington Heights clarified that such a strong
showing was not necessary.  As the Court explained, “[r]arely can it be
said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’
154. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–40.  The Davis Court described “the basic equal protection
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ulti-
mately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 240.
155. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (arguing against judicial review
of legislative motives in part because “[i]t is difficult or impossible for any court to deter-
mine the ‘sole’ or ‘dominant’ motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators”).
The Supreme Court’s equal protection cases reflect a longstanding attempt to cabin the
reach of the clause by targeting only state action that is intended “solely” to disadvantage
minorities. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. R
156. The rule established in Washington v. Davis, which precludes an equal protection
violation from prevailing absent evidence of “invidious intent,” might itself be understood
as based on common law tort principles. See Pillai, supra note 153, at 530 (“It may be R
argued plausibly that the Davis rule reflects the venerable common law tradition of not
subjecting a party to liability without establishing causation and culpability,” thereby oper-
ating in a manner analogous to “rules of criminal law or tort litigation”).
157. 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
240–41 & n.7 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Title VII words “‘because of’ do
not mean ‘solely because of,’” and that Congress had expressly rejected an amendment to
the statute that would have accomplished precisely that).
158. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965) (stating that proof “that an
identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%” is insufficient
to meet the requirement of establishing “purposeful discrimination based on race alone”
(emphasis added)); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam) (stating that
the Equal Protection Clause is violated whenever individuals are excluded from serving as
jurors “solely because of their race” (emphasis added)); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589
(1935) (same); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (same); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1879) (explaining that it is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause to compel “a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a
panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone, however well qualified in other respects”).
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one.”159  The reasoning mirrored language from the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which states that for an act to satisfy the causation stan-
dard and warrant tort liability, “it is only necessary that it be a legal
cause of the harm.  It is not necessary that it be the cause, using the
word ‘the’ as meaning the sole and even the predominant cause.”160
If the discriminatory purpose need not be the “sole” or predomi-
nant purpose, then to what extent must the discriminatory purpose
factor into the decision?  The Court’s answer again tracked general
causation principles borrowed from the law of tort.  According to the
Restatement, an actor’s conduct is a legal cause of harm to another
where that “conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm.”161  A “substantial factor” is one that would “lead reasonable
men to regard it as a cause” of the plaintiff’s harm.162  Professor Brest
similarly argued that the proper test in cases in which an unconstitu-
tional motive is alleged requires the complainant to “establish by clear
and convincing evidence that such an objective played an affirmative
role in the decisionmaking process,” but the complainant need not
“establish that consideration of the objective was the sole, or domi-
nant, or a ‘but-for’ cause of the decision.”163
In interpreting the causation standard necessary to establish an
equal protection violation, the Arlington Heights Court drew on these
sources, reasoning that although generally “courts refrain from re-
viewing the merits of [legislative] decisions[ ] absent a showing of ar-
bitrariness or irrationality[,] . . . [w]hen there is a proof that a
159. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 cmt. d (1965); see also Jeremiah Smith, Le-
gal Cause in Actions of Tort (pt. 3), 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 311 (1912) (explaining that causal
liability should be sufficient upon a showing that tortious conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the harm, it need not be “the sole factor, nor the predominant factor”).  The
Court has invoked this principle in its antidiscrimination jurisprudence, reiterating that
“[d]iscrimination need not be the sole cause in order for liability to arise, but merely a
necessary element of the set of factors that caused the decision.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a).
162. Id. § 431(a) cmt. a.
163. Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legis-
lative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 130–31.  The Court’s decision in Arlington Heights rep-
resented a rejection of the approach to the review of legislative motive embodied in the
Court’s controversial decision in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).  In Palmer, the
Court refused to overturn the City of Jackson’s decision to shut down its public swimming
pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis, reasoning that motive was irrele-
vant to the question of whether state action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
218–19, 224–26.  In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court reconceptualized the role that
motive should play in the constitutional inquiry along the lines sketched out by Professor
Paul Brest in his influential article on the problem. See Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 266
n.12 (citing Brest, supra, at 116–18).
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discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision,
this judicial deference is no longer justified.”164  Proof of discrimina-
tory purpose, according to the Court in Arlington Heights, is established
upon a showing that an “invidious discriminatory purpose was a moti-
vating factor” for the decision165—the plaintiff need not prove that
such purpose was the sole motivating factor,166 or even that such pur-
pose had “primacy.”167
The Court revisited the issue in Personnel Administrator of Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney,168 a case involving an equal protection challenge to a
Massachusetts law that accorded a civil service hiring preference to
veterans.  On its face, the veterans preference was gender-neutral; fe-
male veterans were equally entitled to the preference.169  However,
because the vast majority of veterans were male, the preference clearly
had a disparate impact on female job applicants.170  Conceding that
the disparate impact of the preference was readily apparent to
lawmakers, the Court, again consistent with general tort principles,
rejected a standard that would equate knowledge of disparate impact
with discriminatory purpose.171  Under general tort principles, it often
164. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 266.  Perhaps because the issue is “purpose,” not “causation,” the Court
adopted the term “motivating” in lieu of the Restatement’s “substantial” or Brest’s “affirma-
tive” without indicating that the “motivating” factor test differed materially from the “sub-
stantial” factor test. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
& n.2 (1977) (using the terms “motivating” and “substantial” interchangeably (citing Ar-
lington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270–71 n.21)); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 238–39 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that some lower courts had employed a
“substantial” or “motivating” factor analysis in the employment discrimination context, sug-
gesting that the Court understood the terms to be synonymous); id. at 259 (White, J., con-
curring) (quoting the Mt. Healthy Court’s use of the terms “substantial” and “motivating” as
synonyms); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 507–10 (2006) (asserting that there is “no
possible logical distinction” between a substantial factor and motivating factor test in light
of the causal framework the Court used in Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse).
166. Arlington Heights, 426 U.S. at 266; see also Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 28–30
(2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the use of the word “solely” in Batson should not be read as an
indication that a defendant carried a higher burden of proof in the peremptory challenge
context than he did in any other context in which proof of purposeful discrimination is
necessary to prevail on a claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause); cf. Brest, supra
note 163, at 119 n.123 (urging that when a decision is motivated by both legitimate and R
illegitimate objectives, the decision “should be invalidated if the illicit objective played any
material role in the decision”).
167. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 n.11 (“The search for legislative purpose is
often elusive enough without a requirement that primacy be ascertained.” (quoting Mc-
Ginnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973)) (citation omitted)).
168. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
169. Id. at 274.
170. Id. at 270–71.
171. Id. at 278–81.
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is “held not to be sufficient that the actor knew that his conduct was
substantially certain to produce the injury, and it may be necessary
that he desired to bring it about.”172  Likewise, the Feeney Court ac-
knowledged that given the foreseeability of the disparate impact on
women caused by the veterans preference, “[i]t would . . . be disingen-
uous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for wo-
men were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in
the sense that they were not foreseeable.”173  But discriminatory pur-
pose implies “more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences.  It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”174
Because Feeney could not demonstrate that Massachusetts’ veterans
preference was the product, even in part, of a discriminatory purpose,
her claim failed.175
Although the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights and Feeney both failed
to prove that legislative or administrative classifications were inten-
tionally designed to effect a discriminatory purpose, these cases have
been regularly invoked by the Court for the proposition that the
plaintiff’s proof of discriminatory purpose under Washington v. Davis
does not require the plaintiff to prove that a discriminatory purpose
was the sole or predominant factor in the decision.176  Accordingly,
the Court’s equal protection cases make clear that the relevant ques-
tion is not whether the challenged action was taken in part, even in
large part, for legitimate motives; rather, it is whether the decision was
motivated, even in part, by an improper purpose—whether an invidious
discriminatory purpose was “a motivating factor” in the decision.177
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. i (1977).
173. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278.
174. Id. at 279 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 281.
176. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271–72 & n.3
(1993) (citing Feeney for the principle that a cause of action for deprivation of equal protec-
tion requires proof that a decisionmaker was motivated “at least in part” by the adverse
effects that the decision might have on a given group).  In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
Justice Stevens, in dissent, reiterated the causal link that a plaintiff must establish, stating:
It is elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of injury alone;
rather, the plaintiff must connect the injury to an act of the defendant in order to
establish prima facie that the defendant is liable.  Although the causal link must
have substance, the act need not constitute the sole or primary cause of the harm.
490 U.S. 642, 672–73 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430–433; and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
177. Although the general equal protection causation test only requires evidence that
the illicit motive was “a motivating factor,” the Court has not followed this reasoning in its
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These principles clarify the question of what constitutes an im-
proper purpose for a peremptory strike, and the Supreme Court has
in fact invoked them for that purpose in its Batson jurisprudence.  In
Hernandez, for instance, the Court cited Washington v. Davis’s com-
mand that proof of disparate impact is not enough to establish an
equal protection violation178 and Feeney’s teaching that the showing
necessary to establish a violation is that the course of action was “at
least in part” chosen because of the invidious purpose.179  More re-
cently, in the first of the two Miller-El decisions, the Court explicitly
stated that an objecting party will satisfy his burden under Batson by
demonstrating that race was “a motivating factor” for the exercise of a
peremptory strike.180 Miller-El did not demand any proof that the
strikes were solely or predominantly the product of invidious intent.
In addition, the lower courts that have sanctioned mixed-motive analy-
sis have also acknowledged that the “not motivated even in part” stan-
dard represents the proper definition of neutrality.  Chief among
them is the Second Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Senkowski, which
acknowledged that a discriminatory purpose is established by proof
that such a purpose is “part of a motivation,”181 and rejected the pro-
position that Batson must be read to require proof that the improper
purpose was the “sole motivation” for the peremptory strike.182
Given that the burden of proving discriminatory purpose is satis-
fied upon a showing that an illicit factor was even a partial considera-
tion by the actor, the contention is foreclosed that a mixed-motive
explanation—at least one that admits that a discriminatory purpose
was part of the motivation for excluding a juror—can be deemed
facially valid.183
redistricting cases.  There, the Court has required a showing that race was “the predomi-
nant factor” that led to a particular outcome. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show . . . that race was the predominant factor moti-
vating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.”); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (plurality opinion).
178. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359–60 (1991) (plurality opinion).
179. Id. at 360–61.
180. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003) (“Even though the practice of jury
shuffling might not be denominated as a Batson claim because it does not involve a per-
emptory challenge, the use of the practice here tends to erode the credibility of the prose-
cution’s assertion that race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection.”); see also id. at
347 (“The supposition that race was a factor could be reinforced by the fact that the prose-
cutors marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards.”).
181. 986 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1993).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (Baird,
J., concurring) (“No ‘neutral explanation’ can serve to rebut the presumption that the
condemned practice of exclusion based on race occurred when the prosecutor admits that
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C. Mixed-Motive Explanations Are Not Neutral
Like Justice Marshall, the state courts that have adopted the “taint
approach” to the mixed-motive problem have recognized that any ap-
proach to a mixed-motive explanation that “does not prohibit a prose-
cutor from striking a juror even when the decision is based in part” on
an improper reason “cannot be squared with Batson’s unqualified re-
quirement that the state offer ‘a neutral explanation’ for its peremp-
tory challenge.”184  A mixed-motive explanation is not a neutral
explanation under the applicable equal protection standards because
the prosecutor has in effect admitted that an improper purpose was “a
motivating factor” in her decision to strike a juror.185
The conclusion that a mixed-motive explanation cannot possibly
be considered neutral is strengthened by consideration of the nature
of the step-two inquiry.  As the Court has strongly underscored, step
two does not involve, or even allow, any credibility assessment.186  The
strict ban on credibility assessment at step two virtually eliminates a
court’s discretion to disregard a discriminatory admission.  Just as a
court may not dismiss a facially neutral justification as “implausible,” it
may not pick and choose which among several proffered reasons to
believe, or choose to credit one articulated reason but disregard an-
other.  To do so would require it to weigh the evidence prematurely
and make precisely those credibility assessments that the Supreme
Court has unambiguously stated are not appropriate at step two.  In-
stead, the Court must assume that “the proffered reasons for the per-
emptory challenges are [all] true,” and only then determine if “the
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.”187
As noted above, the raison d’etre of the Batson framework is to an-
swer the question whether the conduct that has a disparate impact (in
this case, the peremptory strike) can be traced to a discriminatory pur-
such an exclusion did occur.” (quoting McKinney v. State, 761 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986)).
185. See, e.g., Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 926 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“To be ‘neutral,’ the explanation must be based wholly on nonracial criteria.”); Owens v.
State, 531 So. 2d 22, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that it “fail[s] . . . to see how any
explanation . . . [that] is based, in part, on race” could satisfy Batson’s requirements for
establishing a neutral explanation).
186. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 & n.7 (2005) (noting that the persua-
siveness of the justification does not become relevant until the third step); Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (“The Court of Appeals erred by combining Bat-
son’s second and third steps into one, requiring that the justification tendered at step two
be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive . . . .”).
187. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 34 12-FEB-07 15:23
312 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:279
pose.  An explanation that includes an impermissible motive as one of
several motives evinces that the peremptory strike was exercised “at
least in part” for a discriminatory purpose.188  After all, if the imper-
missible factor really was superfluous to a prosecutor’s decision to
strike a juror, the prosecutor would not have felt compelled to include
it in her explanation.  Thus, mixed-motive explanations are not neu-
tral—that is, they are facially inconsistent with equal protection.189
Given that a mixed-motive explanation necessarily fails the step-
two neutrality requirement, what is the appropriate response when
such an explanation is proffered?  Should the inquiry come to an
end?  If not, is it necessary, or even permissible, to move on to step
three notwithstanding that the proponent of the strike has failed to
carry her burden?
D. Conventional Pretext Analysis in Mixed-Motive Cases
Proceeding to step three in a mixed-motive Batson case, as some
courts have done,190 is an error because Batson’s framework was de-
signed to elucidate whether a decision to exercise peremptory strikes
was made on the basis of a discriminatory purpose.191  Whether the
explanation provided by the prosecutor to justify the strike was truth-
ful or “pretextual,” as Batson’s third step is designed to elucidate, is
simply not the relevant inquiry in a mixed-motive case.  First, it ren-
ders superfluous the conditional nature of the Batson framework,
which only directs courts to undertake a factual assessment if the pros-
ecutor carries her step-two burden of production.192  If that condi-
188. Id. at 360 (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
When a prosecutor admits that she considered race when deciding whether to strike a
juror, she seems to acknowledge implicitly that race was at least one of several causal fac-
tors in her decision.  This implicit acknowledgement is strong evidence that she viewed
race as having some bearing on her conduct.
189. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (Baird,
J., concurring) (stating that “equal protection is denied whenever race is a factor in the
exercise of a peremptory challenge.  This ‘bright line’ rule is necessary because one simply
cannot articulate a ‘race-neutral’ explanation for exercising a peremptory strike when race
is a part of that explanation.”). But see id. at 869 (majority opinion) (rejecting the bright-
line rule urged by the concurring opinion in favor of a mixed-motive analysis approach).
190. See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F. Supp. 2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that Bat-
son’s step-two inquiry can be satisfied by articulating race-based and race-neutral rationales
for strikes), rev’d en banc, Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006); People v. Howard,
513 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (per curiam).
191. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359–60.
192. The conditional nature of Batson’s framework has been acknowledged by the Ninth
Circuit. See, e.g., Yee v. Duncan, 441 F.3d 851, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2006) (terminating Batson
inquiry at step two where the prosecutor could not remember her reason for striking a
male juror); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that
when “a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation,” the prosecutor
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tional requirement were ignored, then there would be no burden at
all at step two, and would amount to a wholesale rewriting of Batson.
Second, moving to step three propels courts toward the wrong
inquiry.  In a conventional Batson case, the issue at step three is
whether the neutral explanation offered by the prosecutor is true.193
If it is, then the strike was not the product of a discriminatory pur-
pose.  The party objecting to the strike carries the burden to prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the neutral explanation was
not true, that is, that it was a pretext for an illicit purpose.194 Likewise,
in a typical pretext case—for which the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
framework was devised—the factual issue to be resolved at step three
is whether the facially neutral reasons articulated by the defendant at
step two were the real reasons for the adverse employment decision,
or whether they are more likely than not a “pretext” for the “true”
reason.195
The dispositive issue in a mixed-motive case, however, is not
whether the actor harbored a discriminatory purpose, per Washington
v. Davis, but whether that purpose had a causal effect.196  That is not
the case once an illicit motive has been admitted or proved.  As the
plurality in Price Waterhouse explained, “[w]here a decision was the
product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives . . . it sim-
ply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was ‘the true
reason’ for the decision—which is the question asked by Burdine.”197
After all, it may very well be true in a mixed-motive case (indeed, it is
presupposed) that the legitimate reasons played a part in the em-
has failed to satisfy her burden of production, thus ending the Batson analysis at step two
(quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (plurality opinion))). But see Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d
1304, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a strike, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s failure
to adduce an explanation, based on “circumstantial evidence” suggesting race-neutral
grounds for the strike).
193. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (“The question is not whether the stated reason repre-
sents a sound strategic judgment, but ‘whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a
peremptory challenge should be believed.’” (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (plurality
opinion))).
194. Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1993).  The central question in a
pretext case is whether the facially neutral explanation proffered by the challenged party
was the real reason for the exercise of the strike, or rather was merely a pretext for the
illicit, discriminatory, purpose. Id. at 27.
195. Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination
Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1383
(1990).
196. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (not-
ing that an actor “may not . . . prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and
sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the
decision”).
197. Id. at 247 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ployer’s decision.  At most, what is at issue is whether the employer
still would have made the decision in the absence of the illegitimate
consideration.  The truthfulness of any other, neutral justifications as-
serted by the actor remains relevant; after all, if those reasons prove to
be pretextual (that is, if they were invented to cover up for the “true”
illegitimate purpose) then there is no possible doubt that the imper-
missible reason “caused” the adverse action.  But proof that the legiti-
mate reasons were not pretextual does not resolve the causation
question, it merely complicates it.
Because mixed-motive cases are conceptually distinct from pre-
text cases, courts should not proceed to a conventional pretext analy-
sis after the proponent of a challenged strike proffers a mixed-motive
explanation.198  The question is not whether a mixed-motive explana-
tion should be subjected to standard pretext analysis, but whether the
mixed-motive principles used in other contexts should be invoked to
give the prosecutor an opportunity to save a peremptory strike not-
withstanding her failure to carry her burden at step two.  Although
properly rejecting the Burdine framework, the Howard court’s applica-
tion of the Mt. Healthy same-decision test wholly failed to consider
whether a showing that an improper purpose was a motivating factor
for a strike was itself sufficient to terminate the Batson inquiry, or
whether the use of mixed motive in the context of a peremptory chal-
lenge was consistent with Batson’s underlying purposes.199
IV. MIXED MOTIVE UNDERMINES BATSON
The Second Circuit in Howard found it appropriate to use mixed-
motive analysis because, it asserted, such analysis had been implicitly
sanctioned by the Supreme Court.  Citing Mt. Healthy and Arlington
Heights, the Howard court contended:
198. In this case, rejection of the conventional Burdine framework is not contrary to the
well-established principle that the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden to prove purposeful
discrimination, as some have argued.  See id. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting
that Burdine makes clear that “[t]he final burden of persuasion . . . belongs to the plain-
tiff”).  Proponents of retaining Burdine’s framework in mixed-motive cases have misunder-
stood the essential purpose of the Burdine test: to determine whether discriminatory bias
infected the decisionmaking process.  A plaintiff who has established mixed motives has
already carried that burden.  As Justice O’Connor noted in Price Waterhouse, once a plaintiff
has established that an improper purpose was a substantial factor in the proponent’s deci-
sion, she has “taken her proof as far as it could go.” See id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (explaining that the plaintiff had met her burden by proving that gender-based
stereotypes played a significant role in the defendant’s decision).
199. See Howard, 986 F.2d at 30 (concluding that a dual-motivation analysis applies to
Batson challenges, but remanding the case to the district court to apply it).
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In the realm of constitutional law, whenever challenged
action would be unlawful if improperly motivated, the Su-
preme Court has made it clear that the challenged action is
invalid if motivated in part by an impermissible reason but
that the alleged offender is entitled to the defense that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the im-
proper motive.200
If the Second Circuit’s sweeping assertion that a single standard
has been utilized in all constitutional cases where motivation is an is-
sue were true, then the Second Circuit’s resort to mixed motive in
Howard might be more defensible.  But a single standard has never
been uniformly employed.  In the redistricting context, for example, a
plaintiff not only must prove that race was a “substantial” or “motivat-
ing” factor for the legislature’s choice of a district’s contours, but it
must also prove that race was the “predominant” factor.201  That is,
the Equal Protection Clause demands proof not only that race was the
but-for cause of the particular lines drawn by the legislature, but that
other neutral concerns were “subordinated” to achieve the challenged
outcome.202
200. Id. at 26.
201. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show,
either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more
direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivat-
ing the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.”)
202. See id. (“To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordi-
nated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compact-
ness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual
shared interests, to racial considerations.”).  In Bush v. Vera, a redistricting case in which
the Court found that producing “minority-majority” districts and protecting incumbents
were mixed motives in drawing the challenged districts, the plaintiffs’ proof that race influ-
enced the shape of the district was, in itself, insufficient to require strict scrutiny.  517 U.S.
952, 958–59 (1996) (plurality opinion).  The Court explained:
The appellants concede that one of Texas’ goals in creating the three dis-
tricts at issue was to produce majority-minority districts, but they also cite evi-
dence that other goals, particularly incumbency protection (including protection
of ‘functional incumbents,’ i.e., sitting members of the Texas Legislature who had
declared an intention to run for open congressional seats), also played a role in
the drawing of the district lines.
Id. at 959.  According to the plurality, the unique considerations, both of proof and pur-
pose, in the redistricting context were believed to justify a different standard.  Under the
plurality’s standard, the plaintiffs were obligated to prove that race was the “predominant”
motive. Id.  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas observed that the Court’s new test was
substantially more strict than the but-for causation standard employed in other contexts.
Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the plurality’s finding that creation
of minority-majority districts does not necessarily require strict scrutiny; doing so “means
that the legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a majority-minority district that would
not have existed but for the express use of racial classifications—in other words, that a
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Choice of a particular standard for application of strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, depends on the context
and purpose in which that standard is utilized.203  Whether the same-
decision test found appropriate in other constitutional tort and legis-
lative motive cases should be transferred to Batson, therefore, depends
on whether that causation standard is appropriate to the Batson con-
text and furthers its purposes.  Certainly, if a chosen threshold stan-
dard conflicts with or undermines the basic goals in an area of law, the
chosen standard rather than the goals should give way, as the Court’s
redistricting jurisprudence demonstrates.  As the Article establishes
below, mixed-motive analysis undermines Batson’s expressive function,
undercuts its practical effectiveness, and requires the trial court to en-
gage in counterfactual speculation for which it is wholly ill-equipped.
A. Symbolism, Deterrence, and Diversity
The Equal Protection Clause was intended “to put an end to gov-
ernmental discrimination on account of race,”204 and Batson advances
that goal in three ways: it symbolizes official intolerance of discrimina-
tion in jury selection; it seeks to deter such discrimination; and it pro-
vides marginal incentives not to strike minority jurors and thereby
enhances jury diversity.  Of these functions, Batson probably has
served the first most successfully.  As a rhetorical device, Batson and its
progeny have sent a strong message to the criminal justice system that
discrimination in jury selection cannot and will not be tolerated.205
Indeed, the Court has stated that nowhere is the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s command to eliminate official racial discrimination more com-
pelling than in the judicial system;206 Batson was crafted specifically
majority-minority district is created ‘because of,’ and not merely ‘in spite of,’ racial
demographics” (emphasis added)).
203. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958 (plurality opinion) (noting that “[o]ur precedents have
used a variety of formulations to describe the threshold for the application of strict
scrutiny”).
204. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
205. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Color-
blindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (1993) (arguing that “the Batson line of
cases acts as a lightning rod for all of the Court’s unexpressed concerns about racism in the
criminal justice system”); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV.
240, 244 (1992) (asserting that “the Court’s extension of Batson to a criminal defendant’s
exercise of peremptory challenges stands as a powerful condemnation of race-based judg-
ments in the courtroom”).  Some, however, have argued that the symbolic value of the
Batson line of cases—demonstrating courts’ “uncompromising hostility to race-based judg-
ments”—is outweighed by the time and energy that scrutinizing race-based challenges di-
verts from the examination of the merits of the case. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
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with this goal in mind.207  The constitutional command to root out
discrimination has been treated as so overriding that the Supreme
Court repeatedly has stated that the exclusion of even a single juror
on account of his or her race, ethnicity, or gender calls it into force.208
Batson was fashioned not only to prevent actual discrimination, but
also to abolish perceived discrimination and to combat “cynicism” and
a loss of “public confidence” in the criminal justice system.209
In addition, Batson serves a diversity-enhancing function.  The ex-
clusion of minority jurors on account of group characteristics “com-
promis[es] the representative quality of the jury.”210  In holding that
the free exercise of peremptory challenges must give way to the an-
tidiscrimination principle, Batson signaled that the traditionally unfet-
tered common law/statutory right211 to peremptory challenges is
subordinate to equal protection’s constitutional command.212  By
prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes, Batson demanded, in es-
sence, that certain otherwise rational generalizations be ignored or
disabled to serve the larger goal of ensuring minority representation
in the criminal justice system. Batson thus created what some have
described as a “special rule of relevance”213 that functions as “a kind
of affirmative action deemed necessary to overcome deeply en-
trenched racial discrimination.”214 Under Batson, minorities receive
special protection against arbitrary removal from the venire.  All else
being equal, prosecutors have an incentive to strike non-minority ju-
rors rather than minority jurors simply to avoid the chance that the
207. See, e.g., id. (“In . . . Batson . . . we noted . . . that the utility of the peremptory
challenge system must be accommodated to the command of racial neutrality.”).
208. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (“‘A single invidiously discriminatory governmental
act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other com-
parable decisions.’” (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977))); see also Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2005)
(stating that “under Batson and its progeny, striking even a single juror for a discriminatory
purpose is unconstitutional”).  Precisely the same “zero tolerance” approach has been rec-
ognized to underlie statutory antidiscrimination provisions. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nash-
ville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting that “[t]he objectives of the [Age
Discrimination in Employment Act] are furthered when even a single employee establishes
that an employer has discriminated against him or her.”).
209. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).
210. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 n.8.
211. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 89 (majority opinion).
213. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing Batson as establishing “a special rule of relevance, a statement about what
this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact” (quoting Brown v. North Carolina,
479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari))).
214. Charles Nesson, Peremptory Challenges: Technology Should Kill Them?, 3 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 8 (2004).
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defendant might prevail on a Batson motion.215 Batson thus contrib-
utes at the margins to expand minority participation in the criminal
justice system.  Both in preventing discrimination in jury selection,
and in affirmatively discouraging the exclusion of minority jurors, Bat-
son furthers the goal of enhancing the diversity of juries.
Mixed-motive analysis, however, undermines these symbolic and
practical functions.  First, by tolerating actual discrimination in jury
selection, mixed-motive analysis is inconsistent with the injunction
that “[r]acial discrimination has no place in the courtroom.”216  Per-
mitting the exclusion of a juror after the prosecutor has admitted a
discriminatory purpose in striking her cannot but contribute to a be-
lief by a convicted defendant that her conviction was the product of
discrimination.217  Similarly, excluded jurors themselves are unlikely
to comprehend the subtle distinction between a discriminatory pur-
pose and a causative factor.  Jurors who surmise the reasons for their
exclusion, therefore, undoubtedly will be no less offended that the
prosecutor harbored a discriminatory bias against them simply be-
cause the prosecutor also identified a separate subjective basis for
their exclusion.  Likewise, this subtle distinction is sure to be lost on
the general public that learns that blacks, or women, or other minor-
ity members, were excluded from jury service notwithstanding the
prosecutor’s admission that she harbored a distrust, or dislike, of
members of their group.218
Allowing the mixed-motive defense sends precisely the wrong
message to prosecutors and judges, who learn that some invidious in-
tent is tolerable, and that they may even be relatively candid in admit-
ting or tolerating a discriminatory purpose.  Toleration of intentional
misconduct is inconsistent with Batson’s basic premises and undercuts
215. Title VII created precisely the same dynamic. See Belton, supra note 195, at 1379 R
(discussing the Court’s concern, which was expressed in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
Co., 487 U.S. 977, 993–94, 999 (1988) (plurality opinion), and Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989), that minorities may receive preferential treatment by
employers).
216. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
217. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (“Active discrimination by a prosecu-
tor during this process condones violations of the United States Constitution within the
very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s
neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.”).
218. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005) (explaining that “the very integrity of
the courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discrimination ‘invites cynicism respecting
the jury’s neutrality,’ and undermines public confidence in adjudication” (quoting Powers,
499 U.S. at 412) (citation omitted)).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 41 12-FEB-07 15:23
2007] MIXED MOTIVES AND DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 319
its hortatory potential to exert a positive influence on the conduct of
public officials.219
Second, like Title VII, Batson’s prohibition on discrimination was
crafted to provide a “spur or catalyst” to cause trial lawyers to “self-
evaluate” their jury-selection practices “and to endeavor to eliminate,
so far as possible, the last vestiges” of their discriminatory tactics.220  In
insisting that there be a but-for causal nexus before any relief is pro-
vided, the mixed-motive test works against the goal of deterrence.
The mixed-motive defense permits a prosecutor who has relied on im-
proper criteria to prevail simply because the prosecutor was able to
demonstrate that there may have been other nondiscriminatory fac-
tors that would have led to the “same decision.”  As the Court has
noted in the statutory discrimination context, the identification of dis-
criminatory acts through litigation provides an important tool to at-
tack subterranean discriminatory practices and beliefs that may
pervade the wider contextual culture.221  Given that discrimination in
a particular case is likely reflective of an attorney’s general attitudes
and biases, and the likelihood that these same biases will influence the
decisions made by that attorney in future trials, permitting the propo-
nent of the strike to evade sanction by persuading the court that the
discriminatory motive was not the but-for cause of the strike against
that individual juror increases the chances that either that attorney, or
other attorneys, will discriminate against other jurors in the future.222
The end product is a vastly underprotective regulatory regime.
Third, mixed-motive analysis diminishes the ability of courts to
reinforce the representational quality of juries.  Indeed, the use of
219. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 2001, 2023 (1998) (noting that “the Batson rule is to a great extent hortatory” and
courts’ acceptance of dubious Batson explanations “may send a message to prosecutors and
defense counsel that the exclusion of minority jurors is generally not going to be taken
very seriously”).
220. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 318 (1982) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975)).
221. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the Court noted that the enforce-
ment of age discrimination claims through litigation is important, even absent a showing of
but-for causation, because disclosing “incidents or practices that violate national policies
respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of
violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the
[Age Discrimination in Employment] Act’s operation or entrenched resistance to its com-
mands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance.”  513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995).
222. Cf. Katz, supra note 165, at 519 (explaining that “[s]ocial scientists would predict R
that, if undeterred, an employer’s minimally causal utilization of protected characteristics
in one decision will increase the likelihood of future utilization by that employer, as well as
future utilization by other employers”).
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mixed-motive analysis may represent a conscious judicial design to di-
minish the affirmative-action effects of the Batson rule.223  In crafting
burden-shifting and causation rules under Title VII, the Supreme
Court expressly acknowledged that these rules were intended to coun-
termand “the risk that employers will be given incentives to adopt
quotas or to engage in preferential treatment.”224  As with other forms
of affirmative action, the application of mixed-motive principles to
Batson would have the effect of neutralizing, at least in part, its pro-
gressive purposes.
Whatever the ideological motivation behind its adoption, practi-
cally speaking, mixed-motive analysis has tended to insulate discrimi-
natory jury-selection tactics from reversal.  Although every circuit that
has permitted mixed-motive analysis in Batson cases has also recog-
nized, consistent with the Mt. Healthy framework, the necessity of shift-
ing the burden of proof to the proponent of the challenged strike,
and has acknowledged that the legal issue in the mixed-motive analy-
sis is but-for causation, several courts have applied the but-for analysis
in a sloppy or superficial manner to avoid reversing convictions.
These cases demonstrate the ease with which mixed-motive analysis
lends itself to the deconstruction of Batson’s already skimpy arma-
ment.225  In addition, cases remanded for the purpose of conducting
a mixed-motive analysis have typically resulted in affirmance, sug-
223. See Belton, supra note 195, at 1364 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s employment R
discrimination decisions dealing with causation and burden-shifting doctrines were the
product of the conservative majority’s “fundamental objection to affirmative action in any
form”).
224. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (plurality opinion).
225. See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
state court’s denial of a Batson motion where the prosecutor proffered a mixed-motive
explanation and the state court did not apply the burden-shifting framework specified in
Mt. Healthy, basing its decision on its “interpretation” of the trial court’s findings as implic-
itly satisfying the standard); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (accepting the district court’s implicit findings that the state court made necessary
factual findings under the correct legal standard, notwithstanding the state court’s failure
to apply the correct burden-shifting framework).  At least one court has further placed the
burden on the defendant not only to raise the initial Batson objection, but also to argue
specifically for the application of the mixed-motive standard in order to preserve the claim
on appeal.  This reasoning appears consistent with a finding that the mixed-motive defense
is an “affirmative defense,” which normally is deemed waived when not raised by the party
that is entitled to the defense. See State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 544–45 (Conn. 1999)
(declining to consider a newly raised dual-motivation claim on appeal given that the only
assertion made by the defendant in trial court was that “the reasons articulated by the
state’s attorney compelled the conclusion that the state’s attorney had engaged in pur-
poseful discrimination,” and where the “trial court [had] expressly found that the reasons
given by the state’s attorney for striking the six minority venirepersons were not
pretextual”).
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gesting that the mixed-motive framework performs little more than a
rubber-stamping function.226
In short, a jury-selection process that tolerates discriminatory bias
in any form does not clearly and unmistakably communicate the mes-
sage that discrimination is unacceptable, and it does not serve the
function of effectively deterring discrimination.  Although as a formal
matter the mixed-motive test is designed to identify instances in which
the discriminatory purpose did not matter (in the sense that it did not
affect the ultimate result), the message mixed-motive analysis sends to
the larger community is that racism and sexism in jury selection just
“don’t matter.”
B. Easing the “Crippling Burden of Proof”
Not only does mixed-motive analysis undercut Batson’s expressive
functions and deterrent goals, it erects new evidentiary hurdles. Bat-
son’s framework was developed specifically to address the “practical
difficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised per-
emptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of
race.”227  As the Court explained, Swain’s requirement that evidence
of abuse of the peremptory challenge over a number of cases was nec-
essary to establish a constitutional violation “placed on defendants a
crippling burden of proof.”228  As a result, after Swain, a prosecutor’s
peremptory challenges remained “largely immune from constitutional
scrutiny.”229 Batson directed courts to abandon the focus on the sys-
tematic practices of the prosecutor and find an equal protection viola-
tion based on the prosecutor’s conduct in the instant case alone.
Notwithstanding this focus on efficacy, Batson has been severely,
and rightfully, criticized for failing to erect an adequate barrier
226. The number of cases in which a court on remand finds that the challenged party
carries its burden to prove that it would have made the “same decision” vastly outnumbers
the cases in which the challenging party prevails. See, e.g., Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (affirming finding that the
Board would have dismissed Doyle even if it had not considered his exercise of his pro-
tected speech rights); People v. Howard, 601 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552–53 (Nassau County Ct.
1993) (finding, on remand, that the prosecutor would have taken the “same action” of
striking the juror notwithstanding his admission that “race was a factor”). But see Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (D.D.C.) (affirming judgment for Hopkins
under mixed-motive standard), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
227. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 n.17 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (noting that Batson was decided in the wake of the recognition that
“Swain’s demand to make out a continuity of discrimination over time . . . [was] difficult to
the point of unworkable”).
228. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
229. Id. at 92–93.
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against purposeful discrimination.230  After all, to sustain her burden
of production at step two, the proponent of a strike need not articu-
late a persuasive or plausible reason, only one that is not itself facially
discriminatory.231  As Justice Marshall observed in his Batson concur-
rence, “[a]ny prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for
striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those
reasons.”232  The relative ease with which a party intent on discrimi-
nating can conjure up a neutral explanation for a strike helps explain
why so few Batson challenges succeed.233  Mixed-motive analysis com-
pounds this problem and thus further undermines Batson’s objective
of easing the evidentiary burden of proving discrimination.
1. Lack of Evidence
Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum—there is
extremely little evidence available even in a full-blown Batson hearing
to shed much light on the question of whether an explanation is cred-
ible.  But the evidentiary problems are greatly increased if a court,
allowing the mixed-motive defense, must also decide whether an im-
proper purpose was the but-for cause of the prosecutor’s decision to
strike the juror.  Aside from the circumstantial evidence adduced by
the objecting party constituting the prima facie case, the primary evi-
dence, and sometimes the only evidence, will be the prosecutor’s own
explanation for her conduct—the objective validity of which is open
to obvious attack.  As one judge observed, “no prosecutor worth his
salt is going to come right out” and admit an intent to discriminate.234
It is invariably difficult for courts to confidently conclude that an at-
torney’s neutral explanation, even when the circumstantial evidence
suggests otherwise, is a flat-out lie.  Such a finding extends beyond a
mere procedural ruling and implicates the attorney in ethical miscon-
230. See Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1475,
1581 (1988) (noting that under Batson, “the prosecutor can easily articulate a non-race
based reason for her peremptory challenges—and often a reason that is difficult for trial
judges to assess”).
231. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam).
232. 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Indeed, as one commentator more
bluntly put it, “[i]f prosecutors exist who have read Hernandez and cannot create a ‘racially
neutral’ reason for discriminating on the basis of race, bar examinations are too easy.”
Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993).
233. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460 (1996) (discussing the low success
rate of Batson claims in reported cases from 1986 to 1993 and surmising that this result may
be because “it is too easy for the responding party to offer neutral explanations”).
234. Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327, 344 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting),
rev’d en banc, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006).
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duct.235  As a result, courts have an inherent disincentive to uphold
Batson challenges.  Given the acknowledged difficulty of identifying
outright prevarication, at a minimum, Batson should be construed to
provide vigilant and unyielding protection at least in those few in-
stances where racial or gender bias is overt.
In a constitutional tort case or an employment discrimination ac-
tion, indeed, in any case in which the conduct of an organization or
administrative body is challenged, the multiplicity of actors and the
availability of an often extensive record produced through document
discovery and depositions creates the possibility that evidence of racial
bias can be disentangled from the causal sources of a challenged ac-
tion.  In Title VII cases, “the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
civil suit in federal court,” which are supplemented “by the plaintiff’s
access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s investiga-
tory files concerning her complaint,” improve the chances that a
plaintiff can meet her evidentiary burden.236  But such evidence is
wholly unavailable in the context of Batson challenges.  Unlike routine
civil cases, Batson disputes “have no pretrial phase: no pleading, no
discovery, no pretrial memoranda,” and “present none of the usual
methods for ‘smoking out’ evidence and narrowing disputed
issues.”237
The primary evidence available to answer the question at issue
under mixed-motive analysis—whether the “same decision” would
have ensued notwithstanding the improper motive—is the prosecu-
tor’s own statements.  A Batson hearing is not, however, psychother-
apy; attorneys are advocates with partisan objectives.  The prosecutor’s
explanation must therefore be evaluated in light of its self-serving na-
ture, and one could logically infer that the admission of any improper
motive is much more significant than the articulation of purportedly
neutral reasons.  Although attorneys can be expected to attempt to
justify their strikes by providing neutral reasons, an admission by a
prosecutor that race or gender was a motivating factor is “direct evi-
dence” of a discriminatory motive, and as Justice O’Connor pointed
out in Price Waterhouse, direct evidence of discrimination has great per-
suasive force.238  Indeed, in a Title VII case the defendant may not
235. Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV.
9, 42 (1997); see also Anderson, supra note 143, at 373–74 (noting that Batson objections R
involve challenges to the integrity of lawyers).
236. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
237. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2302–03 n.239 (1995).
238. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71, 275–76 (1989) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (arguing that the mixed-motive test’s burden shifting should occur only
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rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case “merely through an answer to the
complaint or by argument of counsel.”239  Instead, the defendant
must produce evidence that supports his proffered explanation.240  In
a Batson dispute, the “defendant” and “counsel” are one and the same,
and Batson does not obligate the production of any evidence other
than the “articulation” of counsel.  Mixed-motive analysis in such a
context builds a virtual castle of purported factual inquiry out of noth-
ing but self-serving conjurations.241  As Justice Marshall argued, “[a]
judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a criminal defendant’s basic
constitutional rights should not rest on the unverifiable assertions of a
prosecutor who, having admitted to racial bias, subsequently attempts
to reconstruct what his thought process would have been had he not
entertained such bias.”242
It also is important to acknowledge the context in which the dis-
pute is played out.243  In a Batson dispute, a minority juror necessarily
has been struck under circumstances giving rise to “an inference” of
discrimination.244  The prosecutor has been called to explain the basis
for the strike—that is, the alleged wrongdoer has been asked the ques-
upon the introduction of direct evidence of an improper motive); see also Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that Title VII, as amended in 1991, does not
require “direct evidence” to prove mixed motive); Brest, supra note 163, at 124 (noting that R
admissions by the decisionmaker are “the most reliable evidence of his actual objectives,”
especially given “the ease with which one can lie successfully about one’s motives”).
239. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9.
240. See id. at 255 & n.9 (stating that the defendant has a burden of production and that
“[a]n articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice” to rebut the plaintiff’s prima
facie case).
241. Again, comparison with Title VII cases is instructive.  In contrast to equal protec-
tion claims, a Title VII plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating that an employment practice
has a disparate impact on a minority group.  In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court
instructed the lower courts on remand that a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
based on statistical evidence of disparate impact alone.  490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).  Rather,
the plaintiff must also demonstrate that “the disparity [he] complain[s] of” was caused by a
specific, challenged employment practice. Id.  In explaining why this proof of causation
requirement is not unduly burdensome on plaintiffs, the Court reasoned that “liberal civil
discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers’ records in an effort to document
their claims,” and administrative regulations require employers to maintain records detail-
ing the impact of the selection process on employment opportunities of persons of differ-
ent race, sex, or ethnic group. Id. at 657–58.  Obviously, persons raising a Batson objection
to a peremptory strike lack access to any such information, and strike proponents are
under no comparable regulatory regime to document their exercise of strikes.
242. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927–28 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari).
243. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that “unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory chal-
lenges exercised in any particular case”).
244. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 & n.4 (2005) (explaining that step one
of Batson only requires evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination).
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tion, point blank, immediately upon taking the apparently improper
action—“why did you strike this juror?”  An answer that includes illicit
criteria seems an implicit concession that the illicit purpose not only
existed but played a causal role as well.
Indeed, the question “why” did you strike this juror is linguisti-
cally interchangeable with “for what cause” did you strike this juror or
“what caused you” to strike this juror.  The prosecutor’s act of identify-
ing an improper motive itself is proof that the articulated reason was a
“cause” of the strike.245  A mixed-motive Batson case, therefore, is that
rare exception where the prosecutor candidly, or stupidly, confesses a
discriminatory impulse.  Where there is a “smoking gun,” permitting
the strike is a direct affront to basic equal protection values.246  As one
court embracing the taint approach has stated, “[t]o excuse such obvi-
ous prejudice because the challenged party can also articulate nondis-
criminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would erode what little
protection Batson provides against discrimination in jury selection.”247
2. Unconscious Discrimination
Not only is the foundation for the mixed-motive inquiry inher-
ently untrustworthy, there is reason to doubt the capacity of even the
most honest and fully candid attorney to acknowledge, or even under-
stand, the subconscious or instinctive motivations that prompt the ex-
ercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of relatively intangible
criteria.248  The necessary finding in a case in which the prosecutor
245. The separation between cause and motive may be more defensible in other con-
texts involving groups or corporate bodies, as is typically the case in employment discrimi-
nation or constitutional tort actions.  For instance, although an employee’s supervisor may
have been motivated to recommend the termination of the employee by racial animus, the
corporation may be able to demonstrate that the employee would have been fired anyway
as a result of a race-neutral plan to lay off workers.  Similarly, some members of a legislative
or administrative body may be motivated to take action based on a discriminatory animus,
but a majority may be shown to have pursued the course of action for other legitimate and
race-neutral reasons.  In these cases, the identification of an illicit motive might be concep-
tually severable from a causal account of the conduct that rendered the illicit motive super-
fluous to the outcome.
246. The Second Circuit expressed concern that permitting mixed-motive analysis
might encourage prosecutors to falsely deny that they were influenced by improper views.
See Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The cynical might suggest that
prosecutors will take from our ruling [requiring mixed-motive analysis] a message of cau-
tion not to acknowledge that race was a factor in their use of peremptory challenges even
in those instances when it was.”).  In fact, however, the mixed-motive defense allows prose-
cutors to retain their biases rather than work to overcome them.
247. Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998).
248. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 235 (2005) (concluding that it is difficult for attorneys “to cor-
rectly identify the factor that caused them to strike or not strike a particular potential
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carries his burden under the mixed-motive test—that the admitted
discriminatory bias did not ultimately influence the decision to strike
the juror—presumes that the court can confidently conclude that the
admitted bias was a relatively minor factor.  But the presumption that
the discriminatory impulse was minimal may be based on the false
perception that what exists is what can be perceived—like thinking
that the iceberg consists solely of what can be viewed above the water-
line, when the vast bulk lies unobserved below.
Even presuming that lawyers are always entirely honest and open
about their motivations for striking jurors, there are powerful reasons
to believe that much discrimination occurs at the subconscious level.
Like all people, lawyers undoubtedly form negative impressions about
others based on a wide array of factors, only some of which may be
articulable.  Often, the factors that trigger these negative assessments
may be illicit criteria such as race, ethnicity, or gender.  A well-
intentioned lawyer thus may not only be unaware that her discomfort
with a particular juror is race-based, but might sincerely deny the alle-
gation.  Indeed, believing herself to be part of the “liberal” and “toler-
ant” class, such a lawyer might be deeply offended by the suggestion.
To explain her impressions, she might even lie to herself and identify
some other nominally neutral trait or character on which to pin her
unease: it was not his race, but his age, occupation, education, or gen-
eral demeanor;249 he was “sullen” or “distant”;250 it was the way he
answered questions, his tone of voice, his facial expression, his “lack of
connection” with her, his lack of investment in the community, the
cut of his hair, his bodyweight, or his television viewing habits.251 As
Justice Marshall observed, “prosecutors’ peremptories are based on
their ‘seat-of-the-pants instincts,’” and such instincts may be nothing
more than “racial prejudice.”252  Taking equal protection seriously
means recognizing both the conscious and subconscious sources of
discrimination.  “Even if all parties approach the Court’s mandate
with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to
juror” and that a prosecutor may “plausibly believe[ ] she was actually striking on the basis
of a race- or gender-neutral factor”).
249. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting
that “an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are
legal” (quoting King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984))).
250. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing an example of how a striking
attorney may unconsciously discriminate by characterizing persons of one race as having
certain qualities but not persons of another race even if they acted identically).
251. For a discussion of the problem of unconscious bias and the inadvertent applica-
tion of nominally neutral criteria in a systematically biased fashion, especially in the work-
place, see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1135–45 (1999).
252. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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confront and overcome their own racism on all levels . . . .”253  Unfor-
tunately, there is little evidence that much progress has been made
toward overcoming subconscious racial bias, and little reason to hope
that it will be overcome anytime soon.
Allowing the prosecutor to preserve a peremptory strike after she
has admitted a discriminatory purpose, based on a belief that the
other “neutral” reasons articulated would have led to the “same deci-
sion,” therefore, is to ignore the very real possibility that those neutral
reasons are the product of the same discriminatory animus already
confessed.254  Mixed motive merely establishes a convenient fiction by
which courts, and lawyers, can pretend that one’s improper views can
somehow be walled-off, segregated, and neutralized.
3. Incentivizing Obfuscation
The availability of the mixed-motive defense also creates strong
incentives for prosecutors to give long, elaborate, and convoluted ex-
planations for their strikes.  A prosecutor who realizes that she has
made a damaging admission can quickly move to rectify that slip by
adding several additional justifications for the strike.  Indeed, prosecu-
tors might find it advisable as a matter of strategy to provide long-
winded explanations of their strikes in every Batson case.  If they do,
then every future Batson case will at the least also be a mixed-motive
case.
Encouraging lengthy and disjointed explanations, however, is
flatly inconsistent with Batson.  In describing the state’s burden, Batson
emphasized that an adequate step-two showing requires more than a
mere pro forma denial of discriminatory intent, an affirmation of
good faith, or an assertion that the prosecutor assumed partiality be-
cause of the juror’s race.255 The Batson Court reasoned, “[i]f these
253. Id.  Justice Marshall also added that overcoming unconscious racism was “a chal-
lenge I doubt all [parties] can meet.” Id.
254. See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (1990) (arguing that “[i]f
racial and gender stereotyping are pervasive, it is not at all clear that one should assume
sufficient independent ‘legitimate’ employer motivation,” and that “because racist and sex-
ist thoughts are so deeply imbedded in our ‘cultural belief system,’ the idea that one can
distinguish among such motives . . . reflects a ‘false dichotomy’” (quoting Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322 (1987)) (footnote omitted)).
255. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98.  In Johnson v. California, the Court reaffirmed the neces-
sity that the strike’s proponent come forward with an explanation, notwithstanding that
Batson’s framework does not demand that a prima facie case establish that discriminatory
intent more likely than not motivated the strike.  545 U.S. 162, 172–73 (2005).  The Court
also explained that a prosecutor’s failure to adduce an explanation for the strike at step
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general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant’s prima fa-
cie case, the Equal Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory
requirement.’”256  As the Court explained in the comparable Title VII
context, the burden of production at step two serves a critical litigative
function by “fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that
the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.”257
An adequate explanation, the Court has repeatedly emphasized,
must possess two characteristics: it must be a “‘clear and reasonably
specific’ explanation of [the] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the
[strike],” and it must be “related to the particular case to be tried.”258
Explanations that lack these characteristics fail the basic purpose of
burden allocation, which is to “progressively . . . sharpen the inquiry
into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”259
Like summary denials of discriminatory intent, long, multi-faceted,
and disjointed explanations that are neither clear nor reasonably spe-
cific do anything but sharpen the inquiry,260 and thus significantly de-
tract from Batson’s purposes.
4. Counterfactual Speculation
Finally, the counterfactual nature of the mixed-motive inquiry
poses a daunting obstacle to any meaningful resolution of the causa-
tion question.261  Determining whether one motive was a but-for cause
two would be a powerful confirmation that the inference of discrimination was correct. Id.
at 171 n.6.
256. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)).
257. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981).  The Court
also explained that the step-two burden “serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the [challenged] action.” Id. at 255.
258. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (explaining that
limiting the step-two burden in the Title VII context to one of production rather than
persuasion does not “unduly hinder” the plaintiff, because the defendant still must adduce
an “explanation of . . . legitimate reasons . . . [that is] clear and reasonably specific” to
afford the plaintiff “ ‘a full and fair opportunity’ to demonstrate pretext”).  The Court re-
cently reaffirmed these requirements, and noted that an adequate explanation must have
“some basis in accepted trial strategy.”  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003).
259. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8 (noting the reason for burden allocation and the
creation of a presumption in a Title VII case).
260. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (“Although there may be ‘any number
of bases on which a prosecutor reasonably [might] believe that it is desirable to strike a
juror who is not excusable for cause . . . the prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably
specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20)).
261. Assessments of causation are highly intertwined with counterfactual reasoning, and
they are subject to change based on changing counterfactual assumptions. See generally
Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual (“But For”)
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of a decision is notably more difficult than resolving the question of
whether a given explanation is credible.  Under a conventional pre-
text analysis, the issue before the court is the historical question of
what actual purpose motivated the strike.  Under a mixed-motive anal-
ysis, however, the inquiry turns from the historical to the hypothetical,
and the court must undertake the speculative inquiry not of what hap-
pened, but of what would have happened had the prosecutor not har-
bored an invidious purpose.  The speculative nature of this but-for
inquiry has long been apparent to tort scholars.  Although sometimes
the facts of a case make it seemingly easy to say that some conse-
quence would not have occurred but-for some antecedent occur-
rence, at other times applying the but-for test “demands the
impossible.”262  As one scholar noted: “It challenges the imagination
of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of
affairs.  He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that con-
cededly never existed.  The very uncertainty as to what might have hap-
pened opens the door wide for conjecture.”263
Perhaps even more so than in other contexts, the but-for ques-
tion in a mixed-motive case requires a court to engage in pure specu-
lation.  Assuming that the neutral reasons given by the proponent of
the strike are credible, to answer the but-for question, a court must
first assess whether those reasons would have impelled the prosecutor
to strike the juror or jurors absent the accompanying wrongful motive.
The court cannot responsibly confine its inquiry to an evaluation of
the juror or jurors that were struck, because the probability that a par-
ticular juror would have been struck does not depend solely on the
characteristics of that juror.  After all, the decision to strike one juror
depends on the comparative attractiveness of the other jurors in the
venire.  To make a meaningful determination of what would have oc-
curred, therefore, the court must consider the prosecutor’s percep-
tions of the merits and demerits of all the other jurors who were not
struck.264  Of course, there normally will be no record of those assess-
ments, and thus (except in the rare case where the neutral reasons
and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001).
262. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956).
263. Id.
264. These problems may be further accentuated depending on the specific jury-selec-
tion practices used in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 257
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc) (Womack, J., dissenting) (describing the inherent diffi-
culty of speculating whether any particular juror would have been struck in the absence of
discriminatory animus given the nature of Texas’ “blind struck-jury” system in which each
party privately strikes jurors by ranking the desirability of each juror on a list).
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given for a strike are based on truly glaring deficiencies), there rarely
will be any basis for a court to assess the but-for question.  Inevitably,
its decision will depend on little more than its own intuitive hunch
about how jury selection is unfolding.265  Appellate courts reviewing
mixed-motive challenges will lack even that minimal basis to review
the trial court’s ruling.
Given the highly speculative nature of the inquiry, the tenuous
nature of the evidence upon which that inquiry is based, and the im-
portance of making equal protection principles operative in the jury-
selection process, mixed-motive analysis simply cannot be reconciled
with Batson’s goals. Swain’s requirement that an objecting party ad-
duce proof of a pattern of discrimination was abandoned precisely
because it established an evidentiary hurdle that was practically insur-
mountable.  Adoption of mixed-motive analysis in the Batson context
similarly replicates these evidentiary hurdles.
V. RECLAIMING THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
Not only does the use of mixed-motive analysis directly contra-
vene Batson’s primary purposes, the original concerns that prompted
the Court to devise the mixed-motive standard, which center on the
problem of windfall limitation and harmless error, do not apply to
Batson claims.  Mixed-motive analysis’ insistence on but-for causation
is not appropriate in an antidiscrimination regime designed to root
out invidious bias rather than to compensate victims. Batson and its
progeny are best understood to bar any peremptory strike in which
race, ethnicity, or gender was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for
its exercise.  Such an approach, which represents a modified version
of the “taint theory,” reflects basic equal protection principles, relies
upon traditional causation doctrines from the law of tort, and has
powerful precedent: it is the same approach to mixed motive that
Congress has specified under Title VII.
A. The Logic and Limits of the Title VII Analogy
Title VII has long served as a procedural guidepost in devising
mechanisms to adjudicate allegations of discrimination in jury selec-
tion.  In fact, Batson’s architecture was borrowed almost wholesale
265. See Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari) (asking “how is the factfinder to uncover the prosecutor’s intuitive reser-
vations regarding the unchallenged white jurors” when “[n]o record memorializes the
prosecutor’s contemporaneous justifications for failing to challenge a juror,” and noting
that “given the purely subjective nature of peremptory challenges, such a record could not
be made”).
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from two leading Title VII intentional discrimination cases, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green266 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine.267  Jurisprudentially speaking, it makes sense to look to Title
VII as a guide because the fundamental dynamics in the two contexts
are remarkably similar.268  As the Batson Court framed it, the central
issue in a peremptory challenge case is whether a juror was excluded
“on account of [her] race.”269  Title VII, which is part of a broader
fabric of employment discrimination law intended to eradicate dis-
crimination from private employment decisionmaking,270 makes it un-
lawful for an employer, inter alia, “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.”271
The essential regulatory problem in Title VII is very similar to
that in Batson.  An employer traditionally has been assumed to possess
the right, within the normal parameters of contract law, to hire and
fire employees at his or her discretion; that is, for any reason, or for
no reason at all.  Title VII interferes with the employer’s traditionally
broad discretion, but it does not purport to supplant it.272  As a result,
Title VII permits employers to make employment decisions based on
any criteria except those specifically enumerated by statute.273
266. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
267. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
268. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94–98 nn.18–21 (1986) (noting the relevance
of Title VII “disparate treatment” cases to “the operation of prima facie burden of proof
rules,” parameters of neutral explanation, and ultimate inquiry regarding intentional
discrimination).
269. Id. at 89.
270. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) (noting
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 “is but part of a wider statutory
scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide”).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  This statutory language paral-
lels the provision in the fourth section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that deals with jury
selection: “That no citizen possessing all other qualifications[,] which are or may be pre-
scribed by law[,] shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude.”  Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 405 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil
Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336–37).
272. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979) (noting that Title
VII was not intended to “diminish traditional management prerogatives”).
273. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion) (not-
ing that “Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while oth-
erwise preserving employers’ freedom of choice”).
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Peremptory challenges, which have a historical pedigree as long
as the “at will” presumption in master-servant law,274 also assume un-
checked discretion.  Like the traditional authority of employers to
hire and fire without having to provide cause, peremptory challenges
need not be based on objective criteria, do not have to be explained
or defended, and are not subject to “judicial scrutiny.”275  Just as Title
VII did not impose a “for cause” requirement on employment rela-
tions, Batson did not supplant the peremptory challenge regime with a
“for cause” system of strikes.276  Instead, Batson, like Title VII, at-
tempted to preserve a general regime of unrestricted discretion lim-
ited only by a small set of prohibited causes or reasons for the exercise
of a peremptory strike.277  Peremptories have traditionally permitted
the exclusion of jurors “for any reason or no reason” at all,278 and
Batson took pains to assure that the proponent of a challenged strike
need not give reasons for the strike that amount to “cause” for the
strike.
Given the long-recognized similarities in the two domains of law,
the solution Congress adopted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to the
mixed-motive problem under Title VII provides a ready-made
roadmap to resolve the mixed-motive problem in Batson.  Although
Justice Brennan made a partial case for using a “substantial factor” test
to determine liability in mixed-motive Title VII cases, ultimately, the
Price Waterhouse Court rejected that test in favor of Mt. Healthy’s mixed-
motive analysis, which allows the defendant to prevail as long as he
can show that the improper motive was not the but-for cause of the
decision.  In rejecting Price Waterhouse’s holding and clarifying that lia-
bility ensues whenever an employer relies upon a prohibited criterion
in making an employment decision, regardless of whether or not the
274. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212–14 (1965) (explaining that peremptory
challenges have “very old credentials,” were employed in England “[i]n all trials for felo-
nies at common law,” and were recognized by Congress early on in the history of the
United States).
275. See id. at 211–12.
276. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (stressing “that the prosecutor’s
explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause”).  Justice
Marshall, however, argued in his Batson concurrence that the only way to prevent discrimi-
nation in jury selection is to eliminate peremptories entirely and limit strikes to cause. See
id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer has made a similar argument in
several recent cases. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory chal-
lenge system as a whole.”).
277. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 n.4 (plurality opinion) (noting that Congress,
in enacting Title VII, expressly deleted the phrase “‘for cause’ . . . in favor of the phrase
‘for any reason other than’ one of the enumerated characteristics”).
278. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956).
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“same decision” might have been made absent the criterion, Congress
indicated a strong preference for a regulatory model that is much less
forgiving of discrimination.279  As a result, proof that a prohibited cri-
terion was a “motivating factor” for an employment decision now suf-
fices to establish a violation under the Act.280  The Civil Rights Act of
1991 thus underscores that the interpretive emphasis should be on
the employer’s actual motivation rather than the strict question of
causation.
Given the substantial parallels, a comparable standard is war-
ranted in mixed-motive Batson cases.  A Batson violation should be
deemed complete upon a showing that an improper bias was a moti-
vating factor in the decision to strike a juror.  The additional inquiry
into but-for causation is superfluous to the deterrent antidiscrimina-
tion purpose of Batson, and just like in Title VII cases, permitting a
same-decision defense to liability unduly waters down Batson’s basic
purposes.
B. Substantial Factors and Multiple Sufficient Causation
An approach that identifies a Batson violation upon a showing
that an improper purpose was a substantial factor in the decision to
strike also is consistent with causation standards expressly developed
to serve broader equitable purposes.  As noted above, tort causation
doctrine has long recognized that where an actor’s tortious conduct
was an independent sufficient cause of an injury, the fact that other
independent sufficient causes also contributed to or caused the injury
should not preclude recovery.281  As Justice Brennan noted in Price
Waterhouse, a “causally overdetermined” event is, nonetheless, still the
product of the causes that brought it about.282  Such cases are often
said to involve “multiple sufficient causes.”283
As discussed previously, multiple-sufficient-cause cases are those
in which an injury can be traced to two separate and distinct sources,
each of which alone would have been sufficient to cause the injury.
279. Price Waterhouse held that an employer that succeeded in proving that it would have
made the “same decision” was not liable at all.  490 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion).  Con-
gress abrogated Price Waterhouse when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, inter
alia, amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See supra note 69. R
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
281. Carpenter, supra note 33, at 941; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) R
(1965) (setting out the substantial factor test as an exception to the but-for cause require-
ment); supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
282. 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion).
283. See David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 1127, 1129–30 (1999) (discussing multiple-sufficient-cause cases).
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For example, imagine that two campers negligently light campfires in
a dry area.284  The fires converge, burning out of control, and cause a
major forest fire.  Each of the fires alone would have been sufficient to
cause the forest to burn.  Because the forest fire would have occurred
regardless of the individual negligence of each camper alone, under
conventional causation principles, neither camper’s campfire was the
but-for cause of the forest fire.  Nonetheless, courts consistently have
held that under such circumstances, both campers face joint and sev-
eral liability for the injury.285  The decision to relax causation stan-
dards reflects a policy-based consideration that causation standards
must give way to the need to make sure that an innocent victim is not
deprived of a remedy where any uncertainty regarding the causal
mechanism of injury is attributable to wrongdoers.
Multiple-sufficient-cause cases present harder problems, however,
where one of the multiple sufficient causes was non-tortious.  In that
instance, some courts impose liability on the tortfeasor as long as “the
tortfeasor’s conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in producing the
harm.”286  Some courts may decline to hold a defendant liable where
an innocent source would have independently caused the loss, on the
grounds that doing so puts the plaintiff in a better position than he
would have been in absent the tortious conduct.287  Using the prior
example, imagine that camper A negligently sets a fire that would
have burned out of control, but that fire converges with a second fire
started by lightning, which also would have burned out of control.  If
A is held liable for the fire, then a plaintiff suing under a tort theory is
in a better position than he would have been in if A had not done
284. See Katz, supra note 165, at 497–98 (presenting the well-known “two-fires R
hypothetical”).
285. Fischer, supra note 283, at 1149–50.  In the classic multiple-sufficient-causation R
case, Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), two hunters negligently shot in the direction
of a third hunter, who suffered several gunshot wounds as a result. Id. at 1–2.  Finding
both hunters negligent, the court relieved the plaintiff of the burden to prove that either
of the hunters was the but-for cause of plaintiff’s injury and held each hunter jointly and
severally liable. Id. at 5.  Similarly, Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902), involved two
motorcyclists who simultaneously passed a rider on horse-drawn wagon, frightened the
horse, and caused injury to the driver. Id. at 69.  Both motorcyclists were liable even
though neither of their respective negligent acts was the but-for cause of plaintiff’s injury.
Id.
286. Fischer, supra note 283, at 1130; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263–64 R
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that courts, applying the multiple causation rule in
cases where an innocent cause combines with a wrongful one, shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to prove that his conduct was not the legal cause of the harm).
287. See Katz, supra note 165, at 512–14 & n.92 (discussing windfalls to plaintiffs as a R
problem with applying a minimal causation standard).
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anything, because the lightning would have caused the forest to burn
in any event.
As Martin Katz argues, in this situation one party receives a wind-
fall no matter which causation standard is invoked.288  If no but-for
causation is required, then the plaintiff is made better off than he
otherwise would have been.  However, if but-for causation is required,
then the tortfeasor receives a windfall.  After all, there is no dispute
that the tortfeasor’s conduct was wrongful, and if not for the fortui-
tous fire, the tortfeasor would have been liable for the injury.
To the extent that the mixed-motive problem in discrimination
cases can be (and has been) likened to the problem of multiple suffi-
cient causes,289 it is technically more analogous to the latter problem
than the former, in that conduct motivated by mixed motives is said to
be “caused” by both wrongful and innocent motives.  For two reasons,
however, the multiple causation analogy counsels in favor of relaxing
but-for causation in the mixed-motive context.
First, for policy reasons, overlooking a wrongful motive simply be-
cause the proponent of the strike can convince the trier of fact that
the same result would have ensued allocates the “windfall” to the
wrongdoer at the expense of the defendant, the juror, and the crimi-
nal justice system in general.  For the reasons explained above, strong
policy arguments counsel against recognizing the validity of the
mixed-motive defense in Batson cases.
Second, the purposeful exclusion of a juror on account of an in-
vidious discriminatory purpose is not merely negligent, it is an inten-
tional act,290 and as such, the causation standards applicable to
intentional torts are more relevant than those applicable to negligent
ones.  Where the actor’s conduct is intentional, tort law has long pre-
ferred the more relaxed causation standard rather than the more
stringent but-for causation requirement in cases of multiple tortious
causes where a wrongful cause accompanies an innocent one.291  In
288. See id. at 521 (noting that where two sufficient causes trigger the harm, “someone—
either the plaintiff or the defendant—will always receive a windfall”).
289. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion) (analogizing mixed-motive
employment decisions to cases of multiple sufficient causes); id. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (comparing the burden of proof in mixed-motive employment decision cases
to multiple causation cases).
290. Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of
Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303, 332 (2003) (noting that “discrimination is an
intentional tort”).
291. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSOR AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 37
(5th ed. 1984) (noting the “definite tendency to impose greater responsibility” on an in-
tentional tortfeasor); see also Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer’s Holiday,
37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 1279–80 n.133 (2003) (stating that “[b]ecause of the state of mind
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intentional tort cases, the injury combined with the intent to cause it
establish a sufficient equitable basis for liability as long as the actor’s
conduct might be said to have contributed to the risk.  As the Restate-
ment explains, where the actor acts with the purpose of causing “the
harmful result which ensues . . . [,] questions of legal causation are
not pertinent except where the defendant’s act in no way has in-
creased the risk of harm; it is enough that his act was a cause in fact
or . . . a substantial factor in causing the harm.”292
An attorney who strikes a juror for mixed motives in a Batson case
acts with the purpose and effect of causing the harmful result, exclud-
ing the juror from the venire, and triggers Batson’s deterrent pur-
poses.293  The presence of this wrongful motive certainly increases the
likelihood that the juror will in fact be excluded, even if there are
other reasons or motives that also contributed to the juror’s exclu-
sion.294  It follows, therefore, that as long as the wrongful motive was a
substantial or motivating factor, the issue of but-for causation should
be moot.  The substantial factor test, “grounded in notions of equity
and fairness,”295 places a priority on rooting out wrongful conduct
rather than limiting damages, and it bars actors who have been
proven to have acted wrongfully from escaping a liability determina-
tion simply because they can show that other causative forces were at
work.296  Such an approach is much more consistent with the categori-
cal language of equal protection, and it is more faithful to the courts’
required to prove that a defendant is liable for an intentional tort, any intervening event,
such as another person’s negligence, typically does not break the chain of causation be-
tween the defendant’s intentional act and any resulting harm . . . [from] that intentional
act”); Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, The First Amendment v. The First Amendment: The Dilemma of
Inherently Competing Rights in Free Speech-Based “Constitutional Torts,” 71 UMKC L. REV. 27, 55
& n.234 (2002) (observing that causation standards in intentional tort cases are easier to
satisfy than in unintentional tort cases).
292. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. c (1939).
293. Cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Where an individ-
ual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the deter-
rent purpose of the statute has clearly been triggered.”).
294. See Katz, supra note 165, at 518–19 (noting that in the Title VII context, the use of R
improper criteria in decisionmaking, regardless of but-for causation, is harmful because
“the utilization of protected characteristics increases the risk of an adverse ultimate em-
ployment decision”).
295. Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 643, 668–69 (2001).
296. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 254, at 48 (discussing the multiple causation doc- R
trine and policy concerns undergirding courts’ inclination to find liability even where a
defendant did not in fact cause the injury).
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long-established efforts to root out discrimination from jury selection
than a mixed-motive analysis that emphasizes windfall prevention.297
The substantial factor standard helpfully supplements the taint
approach adopted by several courts.  The taint approach suggests that
any indication or suggestion of an improper purpose might suffice to
establish an equal protection violation, a standard that could be trig-
gered by the mere mention of an improper criteria.  This stringent
regime, however, risks delegitimizing Batson by establishing a standard
courts would simply refuse to enforce.  The motivating/substantial
factor standard has already been utilized in the Court’s Batson case
law,298 and is familiar to courts in other contexts.  The approach spe-
cifically defines the plaintiff’s proof burden in terms consistent with
well-established equal protection doctrine.  Courts that have adopted
the taint approach have acknowledged that peremptory strikes exer-
cised even in part for wrongful purposes undermine Batson’s pur-
poses.299  The substantial factor test, as used in Title VII liability
297. Of course, the multiple-sufficient-cause analogy has serious analytical shortcom-
ings.  The most significant difference between a mixed-motive case and a multiple-suffi-
cient-cause case is that “motives” are not the equivalent of distinct “causes.”  Unlike a
multiple causation tort case, there is only one wrongdoer in a mixed-motive case.  At issue
is not the causal effects of the actor’s chosen conduct, but the proper characterization of
the actor’s mental state in choosing that conduct.  The closest analogy may not be a tort
analogy at all, but rather a criminal law analogy.  Numerous crimes require proof that the
defendant acted with a particular purpose or intent for conviction.  Take burglary, for
example.  To prove burglary under the common law, the state must prove, inter alia, that
the defendant entered a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein.  A defendant
who breaks and enters a dwelling for a non-felonious purpose is not guilty of the offense.
Now consider the case of the “mixed motive” burglar, who breaks into a home both to
warm himself and to steal food.  Imagine further that it is a very cold night, and the defen-
dant can prove at trial that he would have entered the house solely to escape the cold.  In
other words, his motive of stealing food was not the but-for cause of the break-in.  Despite
the presence of mixed-motives, such a defendant is almost certainly guilty.  The relevant
question is not whether there were non-criminal motives sufficient to explain the defen-
dant’s conduct, but whether there was any culpable intent present.
Because discrimination in jury selection is an affirmative wrong, it may be preferable
to treat the intent question as one of culpability rather than one of causation.  A prosecu-
tor who admits to an invidious bias and who proceeds to follow a course of action consis-
tent with it is culpable, regardless of any other innocent motives also consistent with that
course of action.
298. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346–47 (2003) (explaining that discrim-
inatory jury-selection practices “tend[ed] to erode the credibility of the prosecution’s asser-
tion that race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection”); Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) (noting that the decisionmaker must have
acted “at least in part ‘because of’ . . . [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group” to have the discriminatory intent required for an equal protection violation (quot-
ing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (internal quotaton
marks omitted)).
299. As the Supreme Court of South Carolina reasoned, “any consideration of discrimi-
natory factors in this decision is in direct contravention of the purpose of Batson which is to
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determinations and in various analogous tort contexts, clarifies that
the threshold to trigger a finding of taint is the finding that a discrimi-
natory purpose was a substantial or motivating factor.
Applied to Batson disputes, a substantial factor test would margin-
ally strengthen the protections against the discriminatory use of per-
emptory strikes, and marginally narrow the power of litigants to strike
jurors on the basis of arbitrary criteria.  Although some might object
that the adoption of the test would further limit the discretionary na-
ture of peremptory challenges, at least one sitting Justice is on record
as opposing the institution of peremptory strikes altogether.300  Rejec-
tion of the mixed-motive analysis, and reliance on the substantial fac-
tor test, would be far less disruptive of the jury-selection process than
abolition of peremptory strikes.  Indeed, its adoption is unlikely to
have any measurable impact on prosecutorial power. Continued avail-
ability of the “for cause” strike removes the possibility that truly biased
jurors will be empanelled.  The converse is not true.  Widespread rec-
ognition of the availability of the mixed-motive defense might lead to
broad changes in the way prosecutors respond at step two of the Bat-
son inquiry, and it could further weaken the ability of courts to pre-
vent trial attorneys from using peremptory strikes for discriminatory
purposes.
C. The Windfall Problem
Of course, Title VII does reserve a place for the “same decision”
defense, but limits its role to the choice of remedies.  Title VII actions,
and constitutional tort cases like Mt. Healthy, routinely involve poten-
tially large compensatory awards.  Momentous effects on the plaintiffs’
careers (such as tenure for Doyle in Mt. Healthy and partnership for
Hopkins in Price Waterhouse) often hinge on the outcome.  The wind-
fall problem is heightened where there is an element of comparative
negligence and the award of damages requires a selection between
two at-fault parties.  In Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse, for example,
adverse employment decisions were made both because of improper
criteria used by the employer and, in part, because of the plaintiffs’
alleged performance deficiencies.  The but-for causation rule protects
one wrongdoing party from being obligated to compensate another
ensure peremptory strikes are executed in a nondiscriminatory manner.”  Payton v. Kearse,
495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998).
300. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–69 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing “the practical problems of proof” of a Batson challenge and noting that “peremp-
tory challenges seem increasingly anomalous in our judicial system”).
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absent strong proof that the defendant’s wrongdoing caused the
harm.
The Mt. Healthy mixed-motive test fashioned its causation stan-
dard not from tort law, however, but from remedies doctrine in exclu-
sionary rule cases.  Enforcement of the exclusionary rule often means
abandoning reliable evidence of guilt, and sometimes abandoning a
prosecution against a verifiably guilty person.  Even more than tort
and other actions for monetary damages, enforcement of the exclu-
sionary rule “provides some defendants with a windfall.”301  Because of
the strong public policy interest that probative evidence not be ex-
cluded from trial unless absolutely necessary to vindicate the purposes
of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has held in a long series of
cases that the exclusionary rule must be narrowly applied.  For in-
stance, even if the accused initially demonstrates that evidence admit-
ted against him was “a fruit of the poisonous tree,” it remains available
to the “[g]overnment to convince the trial court that its proof had an
independent origin,”302 that it inevitably would have been discov-
ered,303 or that some intervening independent cause rendered the
connection between the unlawful conduct and the outcome “so atten-
uated as to dissipate the taint.”304  Each of these defenses permits the
government, in effect, to use the fruits of unlawful searches or interro-
gations notwithstanding that the unlawful conduct was a causal fac-
tor—and probably even a substantial factor—in its discovery.  These
limitations on the poisonous tree doctrine were adopted even though
their availability inevitably diminishes the marginal deterrent value of
the exclusionary rule and raises concerns regarding the judicial integ-
rity of the tribunals that admit such evidence.305
Whereas tort law balances the goals of corrective justice by opti-
mally apportioning the costs of accidents among the parties,306 the
constitutional criminal procedure cases invoked by then-Justice Rehn-
quist in Mt. Healthy reflect a concern with fashioning the least intru-
301. Karlan, supra note 219, at 2015; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND R
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 28–29 (1997) (characterizing the exclusionary rule
as overcompensating some defendants).
302. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
303. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–50 (1984) (adopting and applying the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule).
304. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at
341) (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the independent source exception to the poisonous tree doctrine “pro-
vide[s] government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional vio-
lations of the privacy of the home”).
306. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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sive remedial scheme consistent with the goal of deterring
unconstitutional conduct.307  Given the virtual absence of any coun-
tervailing interest in corrective justice by a defendant seeking to ex-
clude probative evidence of guilt at trial, the optimal level of
deterrence is quite low.  The exclusionary rule cases’ emphasis on de-
terrence places the analytical focus on the wrongdoer rather than the
victim.  Remedies are designed with an emphasis not on restoring the
victim to the position he would have been in “but for” the wrongdo-
ing, but on depriving the state of the fruits of its wrongful conduct in
order to put the state back in the position it would have occupied
absent the violation.
The enforcement of Batson, however, does not pose any compara-
ble risk of overcompensation.  Although equal protection in jury se-
lection was first recognized as an element of the right to a fair trial,308
limitations on the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes are not
solely, or even principally, designed to remedy a cognizable injury to
the litigant.  A defendant may have an interest in assuring that mem-
bers of his or her own racial, ethnic, or gender group are not ex-
cluded based on those criteria, but there is no requirement that a
defendant prove that the exclusion of a juror on account of an im-
proper criterion actually affected the outcome of the case or other-
wise harmed the defendant.309
Unlike exclusionary rule cases or actions for monetary damages,
enforcement of the Batson right at trial does not result in any obvious
tangible gain for the defendant.310  One of the premises of Batson is
307. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).  As
Justice Stevens explained, the Court has not mechanically applied the exclusionary rule “to
every item of evidence that has a causal connection with police misconduct.” Segura, 468
U.S. at 829 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Rather, Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he notion of the
dissipation of the taint attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences
of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule no longer justifies its cost.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
308. The defendant’s interest in assuring that members of his racial group are not dis-
criminatorily excluded was the initial harm that equal protection doctrine acknowledged.
See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880) (stating that a “colored citizen” has the right
that “in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no
exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them because of their color” (quoting
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
309. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 427 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s decision to permit Batson challenges where the defendant and the struck juror
were not members of the same racial group because the majority “does not even pretend
that the peremptory challenges here have caused this defendant tangible injury and con-
crete harm”).
310. For example, compare Batson motions with Fourth or Fifth Amendment suppres-
sion motions.  In the latter cases, the defendant who prevails at the suppression hearing
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 63 12-FEB-07 15:23
2007] MIXED MOTIVES AND DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 341
that exclusions predicated on race, ethnicity, or gender are illogical
and, therefore, reliance on such criteria does not advance the rational
interests of the striking party.  Even if that premise is relaxed, the ben-
efit that accrues to a party prevailing in a Batson dispute is highly ethe-
real.  In denying a party the ability to exercise a peremptory strike, a
court does not force the party to accept a juror as to whom there is an
objective basis to suspect bias—any such juror could be struck for
cause.
The costs of strictly enforcing Batson at trial are de minimis—at
most, a juror who one of the parties has an unsubstantiated hunch or
belief will view the case less favorably than others will sit on the jury.311
Even assuming that these hunches are accurate more often than not
(an assumption not necessarily supported by empirical evidence), the
litigants’ marginal decrease in control over the jury panel is compen-
sated by the marginal increase in the number of minority jurors that
will sit on juries, thereby enhancing the public perception of integrity,
fairness, and impartiality of the jury system.  The proper enforcement
of Batson claims by the trial court thus does not threaten to reward
defendants with any windfall.
Admittedly, the remedy of appellate reversal for a Batson violation
can look like a windfall in some instances—particularly where there is
no reason to believe that the violation made any difference to the out-
come, or where retrial is not practically possible—but the apparent
windfall only results from the trial court’s error.312  The question
whether the remedy of reversal is appropriate to correct trial court
error, however, is fundamentally different from the question of
whether zealous enforcement of the right in question itself risks un-
fairly rewarding litigants or criminal defendants.313  The harmless er-
ror doctrine has been developed to address this different kind of
obtains a substantial benefit: the exclusion of probative evidence.  The suppression remedy
is so potent, in fact, that in practice it often results in the dismissal of charges altogether.
311. The two remedies for a Batson violation detected during jury selection are: (1) over-
ruling the strike and empanelling the juror, and (2) calling a new venire.  Although the
latter remedy is certainly more onerous than the former, it is still far less onerous than
retrial. See Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 131, at 1435–36 (describing trial court remedies to R
correct jury selection error and noting that “once a decision favorable to the [Batson] chal-
lenger is made the corrective action is easy”).
312. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 713, 791 (1999) (arguing that, because Batson violations are not subject to harmless
error review, “the perception of windfall is heightened when the defendant successfully
challenges a conviction on appeal”).
313. This distinction may not seem so significant to appellate courts, which must decide
whether to penalize an apparent violation with the reversal remedy, because they cannot
“calibrate the remedy.” See Karlan, supra note 219, at 2015.  As a result, appellate courts are R
undoubtedly tempted to “fudge on the right instead.” Id.
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windfall problem, but for reasons discussed below, that doctrine has
not been applied to Batson violations and, for those same reasons,
mixed-motive analysis should not be permitted to serve as a substitute.
D. Harmless Error
It is well established that Batson errors are exempt from harmless
error review.  The harmless error doctrine is predicated on the as-
sumption that it is normally possible to isolate the effects of a proce-
dural error and assess whether the error had an impact on the
outcome.  Such types of “trial errors” include the admission of im-
proper evidence,314 errors in instructing the jury,315 and improper
comments to the jury.316  However, errors the effects of which are im-
possible to trace (such as the total deprivation of the right to coun-
sel)317 or which trench upon interests unrelated to the reliability of
the proceedings (such as a violation of the right to a public trial)318
are not subject to harmless error review because they are considered
“structural errors.”  Like the failure to provide counsel to a defendant,
Batson errors are structural errors, the effects of which are impossible
to isolate or trace.319  Given the practical impossibility of proving that
the exclusion of any one juror would have changed the outcome at
trial, adopting the harmless error doctrine in Batson cases would effec-
tively remove appellate review of Batson claims.  To combat this result,
when an appellate court finds a Batson violation, it results in a per se
reversal.320  Although automatic reversal is a serious threat, and might
314. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (holding that the admission of
evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is harmless error in a
capital sentencing proceeding).
315. See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (per curiam) (finding that
an erroneous jury instruction containing conclusive presumption as to elements of a crimi-
nal offense could be harmless error).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding an improper com-
ment regarding the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence to be harmless error).
317. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (describing the complete dep-
rivation of the right to counsel as a structural error that is not subject to harmless error
review).
318. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (finding that defendants are not
required to prove specific prejudice when deprived of the intangible benefits of a public
trial).
319. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10 (characterizing “unlawful exclusion of members
of the defendant’s race from a grand jury” as part of the “category of constitutional errors
which are not subject to harmless error” review).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that
structural errors are necessarily reversible per se); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that a Batson claim “is a structural error that is not subject to harmless
error review”); see also Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Fail-
ure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 544 (noting
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be perceived as a windfall for the defendant, it serves an important
function.  The threat of reversal creates powerful incentives for trial
judges to ensure that jury selection is not infected by racial
discrimination.
No doubt, the impetus toward the adoption of mixed-motive
analysis can be explained in part by the problems created by the com-
bination of per se reversal and retroactive application of Batson’s more
demanding standard to trials conducted before it was decided.  Many
of the lower federal court decisions that have adopted mixed-motive
analysis, including Howard v. Senkowski, involved pre-Batson trials.  Un-
doubtedly, courts are naturally hesitant to overturn convictions where
there is no evidence of knowing misconduct on the part of the prose-
cutor or where there is no obvious reason to doubt the reliability of
the conviction.  In convictions obtained prior to Batson, where prose-
cutors did not know that race- or gender-based peremptory strikes
were strictly unlawful, it is understandable that reviewing courts might
be tempted to downplay the seriousness of the constitutional viola-
tion.321  Some appellate court decisions that have affirmed the use of
mixed-motive analysis in Batson cases reflect what appears to be a pre-
sumption that the admitted discrimination was de minimis.  Such a
conclusion is easy to justify in a mixed-motive case, since the prosecu-
tor’s purposes are obscured.  The turn to mixed-motive analysis in
these cases has allowed courts to avoid what otherwise would be
mandatory reversal—i.e., as a de facto harmless error doctrine.  But
harmless error review is not appropriate in this context.
A mixed-motive finding is the equivalent of a finding that the dis-
crimination did not matter to the outcome; it was irrelevant.  For rea-
sons similar to those that preclude harmless error review in Batson
cases generally, that argument should not be permitted in the mixed-
motive context.  As a practical evidentiary matter, it is virtually impos-
sible to reliably determine the effect of the discriminatory bias on the
decisions made by an attorney during jury selection.  Evidence that
bias influenced that process should be sufficient to establish a viola-
tion, and permitting a party that has relied in part on discriminatory
critically that “[t]he typical appellate court that finds a Batson violation will simply reverse
the conviction outright, without a consideration of whether or not the Batson error was
harmless”).
321. The same dynamic was apparent in the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 450–52 (1974) (reversing the ex-
clusion of witness testimony in a pre-Miranda case where the witness’s identity was learned
through police interrogation, notwithstanding the failure of the interrogating officers to
administer one of the Miranda warnings, and where there was no reason for the officer to
know that a fourth warning was required).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 66 12-FEB-07 15:23
344 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:279
criteria to escape sanction by convincing a court that they would have
made the “same decision” anyway effectively “shields wrongdoers from
liability.”322  A strict prohibition is easier to implement and preserves
the role of appellate courts in policing jury selection to effectuate the
goals of equal protection.  In addition, appellate courts’ reluctance to
penalize prosecutors for failure to comply with standards not yet ar-
ticulated is no longer valid.  After twenty years of living with Batson,
every trial lawyer is on notice that she may not exercise peremptory
strikes on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender.  There is far less justi-
fication for a quasi-harmless error doctrine now than there was a dec-
ade earlier.
The use of mixed-motive analysis in Arlington Heights also points
to a second, and more subtle, kind of harmless error review.  Where
judicial review of legislative or administrative rulemaking is con-
cerned, courts have a practical concern with the preservation of judi-
cial capital and resources.  Courts abhor decisions on questions that
are moot or not yet ripe, and generally seek on grounds of futility to
avoid issuing edicts that can be easily circumvented.  Challenges to
legislative or administrative enactments based on purported unlawful
motive raise precisely those kinds of concerns.  After all, if a legisla-
ture can simply repass the same statute by articulating a different justi-
fication for it, the initial finding of unconstitutionality will seem rather
pointless.323  The mixed-motive test articulated in Arlington Heights
saves the courts, and the legislature or administrative body, that
trouble by providing that if there is a permissible reason for the stat-
ute that would have resulted in its passage anyway, the court should
keep its powder dry.
The futility justification, however, does not apply to Batson dis-
putes.  Although prosecutors possess the discretion initially to remove
virtually anyone from the jury with a peremptory strike, the legitimacy
of the strike stands or falls on the legitimacy of the reasons articulated
to justify them.  Unlike in the legislative context, where nothing stops
the legislature from reenacting the same bill, prosecutors who lose
322. See Katz, supra note 165, at 517 (noting the common criticism of the but-for causa- R
tion standard in the Title VII context).
323. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (explaining that it is rather
futile for courts “to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters.  If the law
is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would
presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.”); Brest, supra note 163, at 126 (presenting the argument that judicial R
review of legislative motives is an exercise in futility, given that “a particular decisionmaker
whose law is once struck down because it was illicitly motivated will readopt the law, retain-
ing his illicit motivation but taking care to conceal it”).
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Batson motions may not strike the same juror again after they think up
a better reason.324  Discretionary abuses in using peremptory strikes
result in the permanent inability to make the “same decision” later.
Accordingly, there is far less justification for permitting a same-
decision defense where it already has been established that the initial
decision was substantially influenced by discrimination.
Batson cases thus raise no windfall problems if they are properly
resolved at trial, and harmless error review for mistakes made by the
trial court is no more warranted in mixed-motive cases than in a sim-
ple, single motive case.  For these reasons, and given the symbolic,
deterrent, and evidentiary goals underlying Batson, the proper ap-
proach to mixed-motive cases in Batson is the approach Congress
adopted under Title VII.  Defendants bringing Batson challenges
should prevail upon demonstration that “race or another forbidden
criterion was a motivating factor in the decision.”325 Batson’s
nonremedial purposes are better served by a rule that precludes the
use of peremptory strikes that are even in part motivated by discrimi-
natory animus.326  The substantial or motivating factor test, which re-
flects basic equal protection principles, better serves the goals of
assuring that the defendant is tried by a fairly selected jury, that no
juror will be excluded from jury service on account of his or her race,
ethnicity, or gender, and that the criminal justice system itself remains
unblemished by discriminatory animus.
324. Not only does the prosecutor lack a second chance to strike a juror when a Batson
objection is upheld, she also cannot “save” a strike that was exercised for what later is
acknowledged to be an improper reason by showing that there were other adequate rea-
sons for the strike.  On appeal, the question for the reviewing court is not whether the
prosecutor might have had good reasons for striking a juror, but solely whether the prose-
cutor’s real reasons were permissible. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005) (“A
Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.”);
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (“‘[I]t does not matter that the prosecutor
might have had good reasons . . . [;] [w]hat matters is the real reason they were stricken.’”
(quoting Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original)).
325. Brodin, supra note 220, at 317 (arguing that the deterrent goals of Title VII counsel R
against requiring plaintiffs, for liability purposes, to “go beyond proving” that a “forbidden
criterion was a motivating factor in the decision”).
326. Consider the following argument in favor of tort law’s substantial factor test:
If the fire started by plaintiff was sizeable and merges with another fire, why
must the court require the jury to make an estimate at plaintiff’s risk as to
whether defendant’s fire would have worked the same destruction unaided?  If
the flames he caused to be put into motion were actively playing a part, is it not
enough to inquire whether that part was sufficient to warrant an imposition of
liability?
Malone, supra note 262, at 91. R
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VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion and consolidation of the Batson doctrine repre-
sents a widespread legal and social recognition that discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender is fundamentally unacceptable,
and marks a triumph of equal protection principles.  But the story is
not one of unmitigated success.  Increased recognition that overtly
discriminatory jury-selection practices are unacceptable has brought
increased sophistication in masking or hiding the selection criteria ac-
tually employed.  This increased sophistication requires more rigor-
ous enforcement of Batson.  Mixed-motive analysis, however, portends
just the opposite.  Mixed-motive analysis fundamentally dilutes Bat-
son’s protections by permitting prosecutors to exclude jurors notwith-
standing an express admission of an invidious intent.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the propriety of mixed-
motive analysis, but it cannot dodge the issue forever—the storm is
gathering.  Widespread acceptance of this standard will almost cer-
tainly lead to the evisceration of Batson’s already minimal protections.
Shortly after Price Waterhouse was decided, Congress amended Title VII
to provide that a plaintiff who establishes that a discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision has
prevailed for purposes of establishing her employer’s liability.  The
amended Act clarified that the mixed-motive defense, while available,
is only relevant to limiting available remedies.  Congress has thus un-
equivocally declared that any adverse employment action that was mo-
tivated, even in part, by a discriminatory purpose contravenes the
basic antidiscrimination purposes underlying the law.
That recognition is equally valid in the jury-selection context.  As
under Title VII, demonstration of even one discriminatory motive
should suffice to establish a Batson violation.  After all, “[t]he mere
existence of discriminatory practices in jury selection ‘cast[s] doubt
on the integrity of the whole judicial process.’”327  This conclusion is
especially warranted because Batson’s safeguards are so easily over-
come by prosecutors intent on discriminating in jury selection, and
because the evidence available to determine whether a strike was exer-
cised for an improper purpose is so elusive.328  Because there is no
opportunity to take discovery, no ability to examine the prosecutor
directly, and no other way to substantiate a discrimination claim ex-
327. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
328. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339–40 (2003) (noting that Batson challenges
require the trial court to evaluate the state of mind of the prosecutor, an issue on which
there will often be very little evidence).
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cept through reliance on the explanation provided by the prosecutor,
Batson will be ineffective unless its step-two neutrality requirement is
rigorously enforced.  In those rare cases where there is direct evidence
of discriminatory intent, failure to recognize an equal protection vio-
lation under Batson would undermine the “Court’s unceasing efforts
to eradicate racial discrimination” from jury selection.329  Mixed-mo-
tive analysis applied in the context of discriminatory peremptory
strikes is unnecessary, unworkable, and in conflict with the basic pur-
poses for which Batson was crafted.
329. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); see also supra Part IV.
